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LEXICAL EIDOS FUNCTIONING AT THE LEVEL OF A POLYSEMANTIC WORD

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Abstract: The article demonstrates feasibility of phenomenological analysis based on natural language with the use of the term "lexical eidos". The presentation of the results of the analysis of multi-meaning word "tree" is predicated on the method of phenomenological reduction to determine their lexical eidos. As follows from the analysis, the attributes of an emotional-sensual nature have been "taken off the table" and the reduction to pure abstraction has been carried out. In comparison with the traditional eidetic analysis, the proposed phenomenological analysis for the definition of lexical eidos is carried out with reference to all the meanings of the lexeme. This provides us with the knowledge of not only what is one meaning in its pure form, but also allows to get the eidetic (pure) formula of the whole word. It is seen that within the limits of the horizon of transcendental experience it is possible to determine polysemous diversity of a word. The logical approach allows us to identify universal features in the semantics of natural languages, to expose the fundamental principles of the formation of linguistic meanings, to reveal the community of facts that seemed to be isolated.

Keywords: phenomenology, phenomenological reduction, lexical eidos, word meaning, multi-meaning.

INTRODUCTION

Introduction to the Problem

The initial stage in the formation of concepts is the formation of an image expressed in the conception of an irregular set [2], when objects are combined without any categorical similarity as an unformed syncretic linkage of individual features. This process is launched as soon as a child physiologically (cerebrally) gets the ability to “penetrate” into the conceptual area of abstraction. At this stage, it does not yet realize that a certain word refers to all similar objects and the general meaning of a particular object will be minimal. During this period, many disparate objects that have been in the focus of subjective perception fall into one line and a generalizing content of the concept is derived (tree, hare, bear in general). At this stage, decisions are of a stochastic nature, since often only self-perception dictates subjective classification connections to an individual. If the concepts in that period were not built on the principle of “flexible assembly” and fuzzy logic but were rigid formations, then communication would be problematic.

While learning, the individual begins to expand the concept through saturating the cognitive and emotional context, giving a broader socio-cultural significance to the meaning of the objects or phenomena designated in the word. A word-preconception emerges. So, a *house* or a *tree* becomes representatives not only of the houses and the trees, but also the bearers of a deliberately non-specific image, designed to express all potential objects that have the structure and approximate function of houses and trees familiar to man. Paradoxical as it may be, but the formation of the concept also proceeds from the other side: non-discrete syncretic impressions about one’s own states and actions begin to acquire context specificity. The formation of meanings in this direction is carried out according to higher and lower principle (“The principle of formation of concepts in a language should be considered to be the principle of selection instead of the principle of abstraction” (9: 226). “Thinking also develops, passing from type to form and to variety, and not vice versa” [1: 166]): from universals and particulars at the same time.

That is, there is a unification of similar and a generalization of individual objects and states with cause-and-effect relationship establishment between individual impressions. At the same time, there are the processes of filling of concepts, categorization of objects, their comparison (formation of metaphors), association, symbolization, etc. In parallel, the linguistic consciousness tries to use complex means of linguistic economy – metonymy and phraseological units. In addition, in the non-stop mode, organization and systematization of the accumulated individual experience is carried out. At the same time, the individual uses their own positively supported knowledge about the objects of the world around us and even if they resort to the help of others, they form their own vocabulary with their own “insights” and delusions. We will not delve into these processes and describe them, since we are interested in these fluctuations from the single to the general and from the general to the single, which never stop.

Urgency of the Problem

In conjunction with the foregoing, an attempt to answer the question about the

extent of knowledge behind a single concept, as well as to determine the content that is sufficient for effective communication, seems urgent. Interesting is the perspective to this problem from the point of view of phenomenology, more precisely, phenomenological analysis and, at the same time, to remain within natural language. In the scope of this paper, we will try to demonstrate the formation of the semantic general and the semantic singular in linguistic consciousness at the level of mental vocabulary, using specific lexical material. To do this, we will use data from related areas of knowledge: philosophy of language, cognitive linguistics, psycholinguistics, which will allow us to reconceptualize the theory of eidos.

Study of the Problem

The process of concept formation also occurs at adult stage, and here the theory about two planes comes to help. So, in the effort to express the semantics of any concept from every angle and with accuracy, an individual is presented with a “view with its infinite variety”, which is, according to H. Rickert, a subjective detailed meaning or “background”. In contrast to the background, the foreground includes elements of a general nature [8: 38]. Semantic components or images of this plane can correspond to an outline or a schema, conveying the state “I know it”. In the everyday use of meanings, the background may be absent and occur if there is a need for a detailed “consideration” of perception with the most distinct subjective perception. Since keeping both planes on-line is problematic, one level wins, and often this level is the general foreground.

At the initial stage of the formation of meanings, the background is not separated from the foreground and impressions are not discrete. At the next stage, the background with its detailed figurative and semantic concreteness of the content begins to prevail. “The concrete simplifies the perception of the world around us, but puts in doubt and uncertainty, proving once again that any meaning of the word is shaky” [Ibid. P. 49]. At the same time, the acceptance of this impression leads to the certainty that there is no uncertainty. “Getting stuck” of the meanings of words at this ordinary level leads to the problematic nature of their advancement to a generalized or scientific level corresponding to the next third stage. To move to the third stage, the “naive” or “everyday” meaning of the word must leave the background, having lost numerous concrete images. It moves to the foreground – a more advanced stage, which corresponds to a logical concept that includes general content. An attempt to bring oneself into such a state involves an attempt to interfere with the perception of various concrete images.

However, while the individual tries to present only abstract attributes, a single variety obsessively arises in their mind. The background emerges again, and therefore the ambiguity of meaning. On the other hand, community is associated with uncertainty, which prevents the formation of concepts. H. Rickert argues that a perfect concept can be gained by replacing simple multiple notions of the background with sequential acts of thinking, i.e. several consecutive judgments. Then the imaginative variety will not be a hindrance, and the foreground will be clearly separated from the background. That is, a logical concept cannot be a single representation, it is always a chain of representations. A concept or a formed meaning (which is also a generalization) includes, as a rule, a sequence of propositions. Over time, the concept can be defined more exactly, but again in the form of judgments, but not representations. Repeated transformation of representations into mental acts corresponding to separate judgments can lead to the

formation of common meanings or logically verified concepts [Ibid. P. 49].

This section of the article would be incomplete if we did not mention other important research in this area. So, in Russian linguistics, many scholars have been dealing with the problems of the representation of meanings in the linguistic consciousness and the formation of concepts. So, almost a century apart, A. A. Potebnya and S. D. Katznelson presented their concepts of “two levels” of the functioning of meanings. This is the well-known concept of the “proximate and further” meaning by A. A. Potebnya [7: 120-124] and the hypothesis of the “formal and meaningful concept” by S. D. Katznelson [5: 20]. According to the first, one and the same linguistic essence can be considered with varying degrees of depth: the nearest (well-known, personal) meaning is “popular”, while the further meaning is subjective (contains emotional, perceptible, scientific and cognitive attributes). It can be observed that the same plane is too diversified indeed. According to S. D. Katznelson, formal concept is its definition or presentation of essential attributes, while a meaningful concept is a collection of all kinds of judgments about an object.

To date, there are studies on the semantic affinity of the meanings of polysemous words using the terms “general meaning”, “semantic center”, “semantic stem”, “semantic core”, “lexical proto-type / invariant”. At the same time, opponents of theories about semantic integration of meanings within word structures cite experimental data in favor of the fact that meanings function separately in the lexicon as homonyms [10]. For example, the word “ключ” / “key” in the first meaning becomes not only a “representative” of multiple images (pictures) of keys available to an individual, but also a carrier of a generalized image of a key as a substitute of (sign) all possible keys (from traditional metal to plastic cards) together with knowledge of how they function. With the same graphic and sound form, the content of this linguistic sign is no longer concrete. The further process when the traditional notion of key (its concept) extends and it begins to be replenished with other associations is of interest for us: ключ к разгадке тайны / key to a puzzle, ключ активатора / key of the activator, нотный ключ / key note symbol, ключ, бьющий из земли / sprouting spring, etc. Next, we can assume that the process of further generalization of concepts does not end.

Hypothesis

We suppose that it continues at a new level – at the level of the entire structure of a polysemantic word. Here this paper attempts to argue the fact that phenomenological analysis as the identification of the essential features of a concept can rely not only on the “ideal language” but also on the natural one. At the same time, in the process of using words, consciousness creates a new generalized objectivity – lexical eidos as a set of the most essential universal semantic components, which are determined intuitively during phenomenological reduction. Lexical eidos includes abstract components because of comprehending all the meanings of this word at a new, higher level of generalization. Free from all sorts of facticity, it is a phenomenon of perception, the ideal volume of which is made up of all possible variations as pure potentials of imagination. The experience of phenomenological reduction shows that it is necessary to think logically to come to a “pure” analysis. Regarding abstraction level, this is higher than the concept, it is not even the foreground, but the pre-foreground, it is close to what is understood in English as the forefront – the prefrontal part.

METHODS

As an illustration of the functioning of lexical eidos, the article presents the results of the phenomenological reduction of the ambiguous word “дерево” / “tree” with the aim of conversion of non-explicit knowledge into explicit knowledge. To determine the lexical eidos of a polysemantic word, the following method is suggested:

1) Definition of attributes that “cover” the semantics of each meaning (primary and figurative) associated with a particular form. In the philosophical tradition, an attribute (a sign or a component in linguistics) is any feature or characteristic of an object that can be used for its logical cognition. In linguistics, the following types of attributes are defined: differential, integral, general, specific, explicit and implicit, permanent and temporary, etc.

2) Implementation of phenomenological reduction: elimination of diverse undertones of figurative meanings of sensuous nature by means of sequential semantic reduction.

3) Based on further phenomenological contemplation, the implementation of the next stage of phenomenological reduction: based on the dominant semantic attributes of individual objects, the definition of the lexical eidos of the whole word (for example, a tree per se, then a plant per se).

4) When a given area is also subject to reduction, then the very “directionality” of consciousness or intention remain. The pinnacle of progressive ideation is the area of being which the object under consideration belongs to.

MAIN BODY

Based on the above, let us try to look at this fundamental problem from the point of view of phenomenology. To approach the problem of functioning of the word in consciousness, we will use one of the key terms of E. Husserl (and, earlier, Plato) – “eidos”. E. Husserl characterizes eidos as “the universal given in contemplation or accessible to contemplation – pure, unconditional, namely, in accordance with its own intuitive meaning, universal, not conditioned by any fact. It precedes all entities understood as meanings of words; on the contrary, as pure concepts, they themselves must be formulated in accordance with the eidos” [Husserl 2006: 154]. It is curious that E. Husserl considered words as a sedimentary layer of the spirit and warned scholars about the eternal danger of spiritual creations, precipitating themselves in the form of “petrified” linguistic acquisitions [3]. Indeed, for a philosopher, language is always somewhat dangerous because it allows a free play of associations.

We will redefine the term “eidos” by adding the “lexical” component to it. Thus, **Lexical eidos (LE)** is understood by us as a set of the most essential universal semantic components which are determined intuitively in the course of phenomenological reduction and remain unchanged in the stream of meaning variations, making up the “semantic formula” of a word or an expression. Eidos received the detailing of “lexical”, because it embodies an independent pure essence at the level of the invariant of a polysemantic word, for we take into account the fact that the overwhelming number of words we use are of many meanings. And, indeed, in everyday speech, we do not notice an abundance of metaphors, metonymies and other changes of meanings. Therefore,

when we contemplate the essence, our background can be full of numerous figurative meanings, some of which are more frequent than a primary meaning.

LE includes a program for all (or almost all) meanings of the word and, vice versa, each variant has a link to a model that controls the process of semiosis of figurative meanings. If we are free from specific semantic characteristics of a word, one may talk of an empty form: “something in general”, “something similar to...”, “a form as a whole.” LE has a dynamic character: the process of actualizing meanings by the speaker is conceived as a sequential “assembly” of more detailed structures based on such a construct as LE [13]. Phenomenology has always had a focus on identifying such universal units of the language system.

To illustrate these provisions, we will continue the phenomenological contemplation of the word “дерево” / “tree” undertaken by E. Husserl. The philosopher in his introspection tried to comprehend the “prototype of a tree”, its essence or eidos, distracting from the individual features of the plant and varying in the imagination those properties in which a tree will still remain a tree. Developing his imagination and varying the resulting eidos of a tree in his imagination, he tried to arrive at a more general eidos – the eidos of a plant per se. The pinnacle of progressive ideation is the area of being which the considered object belongs to. When this area is also subject to reduction, then the very “directionality” of consciousness or intention remain. As an illustration of what has been said, we present the results of the phenomenological reduction of the Russian-language polysemous word “дерево” / “tree”, having expanded its nominative field and included figurative meanings in the semantic reduction (дерево/древо / tree as “family line” (family tree), “cardiocirculatory system”, “computer network”, “telephone number network”, etc.).

A possible LE, in our opinion, should include basic components of a general nature, denoting “something similar to a tree”. In the process of analysis, all components of an individual and subjective nature are bracketed out, being reduced to pure abstraction, but with the difference (in comparison with the traditional eidetic analysis) that it is performed with the consideration of all meanings included in the word. The metaphorical realizations in the word are the result of comparing various incongruent objects with a tree. Thus, the metaphor “family tree” is based on the similarity of the generalized image of the tree (foreground) with the branched line of origin of genealogic tree. The metaphor “computer tree” is based on the resemblance of a tree to a layered system of files. As in the previous metaphor, where the lineage of each family member can be established at the level of several generations, like the branches of a tree and the trunk, each individual file can be traced back to its source – the boot file.

The following comparison “the system of the arterial or venous circulation of an animal” for the same reasons is compared with the branches of the trunk of a tree. In the process of “contemplation” of this and other metaphorical meanings, the image of a tree is maximally reduced to a diagram or outline. From our perspective, the abstract essence of the whole word or its LE can be rendered as a system with many branches having a common origin. Elimination of all identifying attributes of the background makes it possible to obtain the most general and at the same time essential components, covering the semantics of all meanings of the word “tree”. The irrelevant is dismissed and the horizon of one’s own experience is revealed, leaving only the most necessary. Being an innate linguistic mechanism, along with metaphor formation, such invariant constructs are formed over time in all native speakers because of a culturally conditioned uniform division of the reality around us. Therefore, on the one hand, they seem to set the

general range of meanings of a particular polysemantic word, functioning at the level of the linguistic system, on the other hand, they find their expression at the level of speech, taking into account the subjective factor and contextual refraction. As a result, such formations act as framing limiters of content, freeing mental mechanisms from the need to scan several meanings and images behind them. [11].

SUMMARY

Attempts in one way or another to formulate the meaningful core of a polysemantic word is explained by the fact that the scholars intuitively feel that such a construct as LE is actually employed by our consciousness. Supposedly contributing to the formation of our understanding of the word, it maintains communication more effective and successful. Our experimental data indicate that meanings are not kept in native speakers' memory in the form of storage and the meanings of a word are not scanned each time to select an appropriate one [6]. Moving on to the level of linguistics, it can be assumed that being in the speech context, LE is embodied in one of its combinatorial variants. In traditional and cognitive linguistics, it is stated that many "outputs" go to the same meaning – they are connected by relations of semantic and grammatical derivation; they are related paradigmatically as synonyms, homonyms; finally, they are associated with the words of their cognitive category or thematic field, they are included in concepts and conceptual frameworks, etc. In this sense, the proposed invariant acts as a cognitive model of general perception and understanding of the world around us; a set of certain cognitive dominants which act as a kind of perspectives of perception is formed in it. In general, the phenomenological analysis has revealed that the functioning of LE contributes to a more effective organization of memory, since being an out-of-context content core or linguistic gestalt, it is designed to convey a generalized culturally conditioned experience of using contextual realizations of a polysemous word.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors confirm that the presented data does not contain any conflicts of interest.

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