



**Supplementary Notebook (RTEP - Brazilian academic journal, ISSN 2316-1493)**

## **HOMICIDE VIOLENCE IN PANDEMIC TIMES: THE “GEOPROCESSING” OF THE MORAL SUFFERING, PRIVATE CODES, THE VULNERABILITIES OF FAMILY LIFE IN THE OCCURRENCES OF CVLIS (2015-2020)**

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**RESUMO:** Os homicídios são o maior problema da criminalidade violenta no Brasil. Responsável por 10% dos homicídios do mundo, segundo Exame da Declaração de Genebra sobre Violência Armada e Desenvolvimento. O Brasil vem apresentando um crescimento de suas taxas de homicídio numa média de 1.580 mortes ao ano e em suas taxas por cem mil na ordem de 5,6 % ao ano desde o início da década de 1980. Desde esse período, o Brasil vive uma epidemia de homicídios sem encontrar uma cura, uma vacina ou um remédio que pelo menos mitigue minimamente esse flagelo que atinge principalmente jovens, negros, sem renda fixa e moradores de periferias. Correto afirmar, portanto, que o Brasil vivencia, há pelo menos quatro décadas um duro cotidiano de riscos e incertezas. Nossa "modernidade tardia" caracterizar-se-ia pela reprodução estrutural da exclusão social e pela disseminação das violências, com a consequente ruptura de laços sociais e a exclusão de várias categorias sociais, como a juventude, uma das grandes vítimas desse processo. O jovem relaciona-se com a violência de modo ambivalente: ora torna-se vítima, ora surge como agressor. Os dados de homicídios dessas últimas quatro décadas mostram uma tendência de generalização da violência. Considerando todo o período de 1980 a 2019, houve um continuado aumento das mortes de jovens e adultos jovens, sobretudo do sexo masculino, por causas externas (homicídios, suicídios, mortes no trânsito). Há uma sobremortalidade masculina e juvenil. Fundamental frisar que, principalmente os jovens vivenciam um processo de transição para a vida adulta, cada vez mais tardio em nosso momento civilizatório, quando então sua agressividade (pulsão) tem o caráter positivo de habilitá-los a se autonomizarem e a ocuparem um lugar no espaço social. Isto posto, uma das características

marcantes nos adolescentes atuais é a incerteza do emprego, assim como o exercício e a vivência da agressividade e da violência. Num mundo de incertezas e de fragmentações, a violência surge como discurso, deveras autônomo. O estudo dos homicídios é fundamental. Pois os homicídios são ações que terminam revelando diversas peculiaridades sobre a sociedade e seus valores. Assim, entender o que levaria a maioria das pessoas que cometem homicídios a agir dessa forma revelaria também, de certa medida, os defeitos e problemas da sociedade que criamos.

**Palavras-chave:** Violência urbana, CVLIs, análise espacial.

**ABSTRACT:** Homicides are the biggest problem with violent crime in Brazil. Responsible for 10% of homicides in the world according to the Geneva Declaration Examination on Armed Violence and Development. Brazil has shown an increase in its homicide rates by an average of 1,580 deaths per year and in its rates per hundred thousand in the order of 5.6% per year since the beginning of the 1980s. Since that period, Brazil has been experiencing a homicide epidemic without finding a cure, a vaccine, or a remedy that at least minimally mitigates this scourge that affects mainly young people, Blacks, without fixed income and residents of peripheries. It is correct to say, therefore, that Brazil has experienced for at least four decades, a harsh daily life of risks and uncertainties. Our "late modernity" would be characterized by the structural reproduction of social exclusion and the spread of violence, with the consequent rupture of social ties and the exclusion of various social categories, such as young people, one of the great victims of this process. They relate to violence in an ambivalent way: sometimes they become victims, sometimes they appear as aggressors. Homicide data over the past four decades shows a trend towards widespread violence. Considering the entire period from 1980 to 2019, there was a continuous increase in the deaths of young people and young adults, especially males, due to external causes (homicides, suicides, traffic deaths). There is a male and juvenile over-mortality. It is essential to emphasize that, especially young people experience a transition to adult life, which is increasingly late in our civilizing moment, when then their aggressiveness (drive) has the positive character of enabling them to become autonomous and to occupy a place in the social space. That said, one of the striking characteristics of today's adolescents is the uncertainty of employment, as well as the exercise and experience of aggressiveness and violence. In a world of uncertainty and fragmentation, violence emerges as a speech, truly autonomous. The study of homicides is essential. Because homicides are actions that end up revealing several peculiarities about society and its values. Thus, understanding what would lead most people who commit homicides to act in this way would also reveal, to some extent, the defects and problems of the society we have created.

**Keywords:** Urban violence, CVLIs, spatial analysis.

## INTRODUCTION: HOMICIDE EPIDEMICS

In 2015, the report on Global Health Statistics stated: Monitoring Health for the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) showed that Brazil has the ninth highest homicide rate in the Americas, with an index of 30.5 deaths per 100 thousand inhabitants. One of the main drivers of murder rates in the world is access to firearms. This is about femicide, homicides of children, adolescents, young people, blacks, indigenous people, women, and LGBTQ+ people. Map 1 shows that several states in Brazil are above the national average (Alagoas 53.1 and Sergipe 57.3 representing the most violent states in intentional lethal violent conduct - CVLIs).


In 2016, the report on Global Health Statistics: Monitoring Health for the SDGs highlights that Brazil recorded 57.6 cases of homicides of men per 100,000 inhabitants. The rate is also high for blacks (40.2 cases) and young people (65.2). In 2017, the country surpassed 60 thousand homicides, as the CVLIs are more commonly known, whose lethal spectrum covers intentional homicide, bodily injury followed by death, femicide, robbery (robbery followed by death) and deaths resulting from police interventions, in Rio Grande do Norte there were 2,412 cases, including 27 victims proven during the Alcaçuz massacre. Homicide rates in Brazil are still among the highest in the world.

The beginning of the year 2020, was marked by the declaration of the World Health Organization (WHO) of the arrival of a new virus, initially in China, which then later spread to Europe, USA and Brazil. On February 29th 55 countries had confirmation of the virus in their territories and on 11 March the Director-General of WHO declared the state of contamination to the pandemic due to its rapid geographical spread. On March 23, all Brazilian states were quarantined. On April 3, all states in the Northeast already had confirmed cases and deaths of COVID-19.

Just as violence, the Coronavirus is more than a pandemic crisis, it affects the strata of society differently, with regard to the reproduction of capital, mobility, income distribution and the class struggle, culminating in the deepening of capitalism in its most perverse version: the price of masks, the price of alcohol gel and hand-sanitizer (reaching 400% more), the price of rapid tests, the price of essential foods, the unemployment of 20 million people in Brazil.

From March to July 2020, homicidal violence figures reveal that even with a worldwide pandemic, there was no respite from CVLIs in most states, including RN, once again increasing homicidal mortality. There are years and years facing homicides of all types and Brazil has not yet learned that hiding data, deceitful statistics, changing methodologies and modifying types of variables is not an adequate way to obtain fundamental knowledge of public security policies and actions that generate results effective and lasting. The fact is that, after the observed fall in violence in the second half of 2018 and the great reduction in the year 2019, in 2020, most states, including RN, have an increase in homicidal mortality again.

Even to a lesser extent, compared to the increase that occurred in previous years (2015 to 2017), CVLIs in Rio Grande do Norte grew in the comparison between the first half of 2020 and the same period of 2019, numbers that lead us to think about the impact of the pandemic and the overload of the security system, which is becoming more and more fragile, given the lack of human capital and resources, to replenish that capital. At the same time, these are expected numbers, given that the reduction in the previous year was a record, around 26.3%, and maintaining this reduction would be very difficult given the resources available.



Of course, attributing to the pandemic the increase in crime in its entirety would not be a consistent argument, however, among the six months of the year, 4 of them are within the pandemic period, so its almost majority effect cannot be denied, as shown in table 1.

**TABLE 1 – CVLIs MONTHLY SUMMARY IN THE 1ST SEMESTER OF 2019 AND 2020**

| CVLIs no Rio Grande do Norte                 | CVLIs 2019 e 2020 |            |              |
|--|-------------------|------------|--------------|
| Meses  | 2019              | 2020       | 2019-2020    |
| Janeiro                                      | 130               | 124        | -4,6%        |
| Fevereiro                                    | 103               | 144        | 39,8%        |
| Março (Isolamento social a partir do dia 13) | 149               | 128        | -14,1%       |
| Abril  | 111               | 157        | 41,4%        |
| Maiο   | 131               | 134        | 2,3%         |
| Junho  | 105               | 120        | 14,3%        |
| <b>Total Geral</b>                           | <b>729</b>        | <b>807</b> | <b>10,7%</b> |

Período até 1 de janeiro a 30 de junho de 2020 comparado ao mesmo período dos anos 2015 a 2019

Fontes consolidadas via Sistema Metadados: ITEP, DATASUS, DHPP, CIOSP, COINE e MPE

However, from the learning of the effects of social isolation and the pandemic, Brazil and Rio Grande do Norte will have important lessons to use in the practice of building public policies and security actions, after all the institutions were publicly exposed and put to the test. It remains to be seen whether this will happen or not, whether there will be an upward step in monitoring the indicators, the goals, evaluating the results of the implemented policies; the fiscal situation of the Brazilian State, which places limits on greater investments in public policies aimed at improving Brazilian social indicators,

evolution, or whether there will continue to be a denial of science and the promotion of solutions forged in political pragmatism and ideological perceptions.

## **METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES**

It consists of technical clippings and snippets containing information about the lethality for intentional lethal violent conduct in Rio Grande do Norte in the 1st semester of the years 2015 to 2020.

The Database is built using the Metadata System. It consists of the interpolated treatment of data from several governmental and non-governmental sources (Datusus, Public Security Data, ITEP, SISOBI, the Public Ministry and some previously accredited journalistic sources), originating from a dynamic collection process called Multifonte Platform created by Hermes and Dionisio (2012).

## **SKIN COLOR IS THE RISK FACTOR FOR THE BLACK AND DARK POPULATION IN THE STATE OF RIO GRANDE DO NORTE**

The Mortality of the Potiguar Youth in the first semester of the period 2015-2019 presents the year 2017 as the most violent, with 1,209 homicides, which represented an increase of 22.9% in relation to the previous year. However, in 2018 and 2019 important reductions were observed, in the order of 14.1% and 29.8%, respectively. The year 2020 marked unfortunately a new increase, when compared to the first half of 2019, of the order of 10.7%. Compared to 2015, the increase was 2.4%. It is important to note that, in addition to the context marked by the pandemic, structural and persistent problems over time, such as those related to the general living conditions of the population - such as income, education, public services - are directly related to the issue of violence.

The first factor to consider is gender. An absolute majority of the victims are men. In addition to the greater exposure of male victims, one of the macro causes pointed to the phenomenon is the fact that men are the greatest perpetrators of violence, as well as the greatest actors present in “gangs”, feuding groups, as well as in the case of small and average offenders. The greater exposure of a violent “masculinity” to episodes, places, and events of risk, increases the gradient of mortality of this gender.

The grouping of the series under analysis represents 88.4%. In the first half of 2017 alone, 1,209 blacks and browns died, and when adding the deaths of the first half of the years between 2015 and 2020, a total of 5,555 were victims of violence. This makes us uneasy: What actions taken in the 2015-2019 period to combat violence would be based on what ideological assumptions about poverty or social exclusion? And what about the increase in deaths in 2020?

Also following the national pattern and, in certain nations with high rates of socioeconomic inequality and excluding racial patterns - such as the United States of America, which despite having averages of around 8 CVLIs per 100 thousand inhabitants, is far above developed countries - , the RN has in its brown and black population the absolute majority (about 86%) of the victims of CVLI. Even the variations in annual homicide rates always show greater growth among these populations (where only among browns did we reach a dizzying 394% growth in the period from 2011 to 2018). These groups are the most economically fragile and, as several studies in the area have shown, tend to live in peripheral areas most exposed to the action of criminality, as well as factors that add up: low education and low income. (HERMES, BRANDÃO, 2019, p. 06).


The distribution of youth deaths by age shows that 33.9% of the occurrences between the first semesters of 2015 and 2020 are concentrated in the age group between 18 and 24 years, and 16.6% of the occurrences between 25 and 29 years. It is interesting to note that the increase of 10.7% between 2019 and 2020 was motivated by the expressive increase (of 38.2%) in the population between 25 and 29 years old, and of 20% in the population between 30 and 34 years old, whereas a reduction of 41.1% in young people between 12 and 17 years old, which can be considered good news, if we take into account that it is an age range marked by penal minority.

Regarding education, 51.1% of the information corresponds to the ignored category, while 32.5% had elementary school. In reality, if we distribute the ignored equally, victims with primary education can exceed 50%. On the other hand, the reduction in occurrences between 2015-2020 at this level of education (-13.6%) should be highlighted.

Regarding the distribution according to estimated income, 52.4% of the victims of violence in the first semesters of 2015 to 2020 had no paid activity. When this group includes young people with up to 2 minimum wages (estimated income), this portion of the population reaches 89% of the occurrences. Furthermore, data for the first half of 2020 show an increase in occurrences among the low-income population. This shows how violence can be linked to economic inequality, the lack of investment in the education of our youth and the high circulation of firearms, in addition to the lack of public policies for the permanence of this youth in the labor market, and / or reproduction of better living conditions. The spatialization of violence by mesoregion in RN shows that the Mesoregion East concentrates 57.2% of CVLIs, while in the West it is 25.2% for the same period.

The "geoprocessing" of CVLIs must be treated with the utmost caution, as well as the other elements presented. This is because, there is a tendency to attribute to certain spaces, mainly the peripheral ones, the stigma of being "dangerous" places, failing to realize that in a society of contemporary criminal standards, all areas of large urban agglomerations have high crime rates, the differentiator being high notification (in the case of homicides of other CVLIs) or with extreme underreporting (like most crimes). That said, our concern is always to try to allow careful visualization and the perception that there are more fragile areas that deserve, therefore, multiple and complex coping. This has never been done before, in terms of combating CVLIs.

MAP 2 – LETHAL VIOLENT CONDUCTS BY POTIGUAR MESORREGION (2015-2020)



The top 10 municipalities in violence in RN (Table 2) show Natal in the first position (25.3%), followed by Mossoró (11.7%), Parnamirim (6.8%) and São Gonçalo do Amarante (5.5%). Of these municipalities, only Natal showed a significant increase in the last year (first half of 2019 and 2020), of the order of 15.8%, while Mossoró remained stable (but at high levels), and followed by a reduction of 29.8% Parnamirim and a 23.6% reduction in São Gonçalo.

TABLE 2 – RANKING TOP 10 MUNICIPALITIES

| CVLIs no Rio Grande do Norte<br>Ranking Top 10 Municípios | Números absolutos de CVLIs |            |              |              |            |            |              | Incidência<br>2015-2020 | Variação entre os períodos |              |               |               |              |             |
|---|----------------------------|------------|--------------|--------------|------------|------------|--------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|
|   | 2015                       | 2016       | 2017         | 2018         | 2019       | 2020       | 2015-2019    |                         | 2015-2016                  | 2016-2017    | 2017-2018     | 2018-2019     | 2019-2020    | 2015-2020   |
| Natal   | 240                        | 299        | 299          | 253          | 146        | 169        | 1.406        | 25,3%                   | 24,6%                      | 0,0%         | -15,4%        | -42,3%        | 15,8%        | -29,6%      |
| Mossoró   | 72                         | 131        | 128          | 126          | 95         | 96         | 648          | 11,7%                   | 81,9%                      | -2,3%        | -1,6%         | -24,6%        | 1,1%         | 33,3%       |
| Parnamirim  | 76                         | 90         | 78           | 53           | 47         | 33         | 377          | 6,8%                    | 18,4%                      | -13,3%       | -32,1%        | -11,3%        | -29,8%       | -56,6%      |
| São Gonçalo Do Amarante                                   | 34                         | 61         | 51           | 62           | 55         | 42         | 305          | 5,5%                    | 79,4%                      | -16,4%       | 21,6%         | -11,3%        | -23,6%       | 23,5%       |
| Macaíba   | 33                         | 33         | 48           | 47           | 46         | 36         | 243          | 4,4%                    | 0,0%                       | 45,5%        | -2,1%         | -2,1%         | -21,7%       | 9,1%        |
| Ceará-Mirim   | 28                         | 46         | 80           | 27           | 23         | 29         | 233          | 4,2%                    | 64,3%                      | 73,9%        | -66,3%        | -14,8%        | 26,1%        | 3,6%        |
| Extremoz  | 11                         | 15         | 26           | 27           | 14         | 23         | 116          | 2,1%                    | 36,4%                      | 73,3%        | 3,8%          | -48,1%        | 64,3%        | 109,1%      |
| São José De Mipibu  | 13                         | 20         | 28           | 13           | 14         | 18         | 106          | 1,9%                    | 53,8%                      | 40,0%        | -53,6%        | 7,7%          | 28,6%        | 38,5%       |
| Nísia Floresta  | 13                         | 18         | 35           | 14           | 8          | 8          | 96           | 1,7%                    | 38,5%                      | 94,4%        | -60,0%        | -42,9%        | 0,0%         | -38,5%      |
| Caico   | 15                         | 19         | 21           | 9            | 13         | 16         | 93           | 1,7%                    | 26,7%                      | 10,5%        | -57,1%        | 44,4%         | 23,1%        | 6,7%        |
| Outros  | 253                        | 252        | 415          | 407          | 268        | 337        | 1.932        | 34,8%                   | -0,4%                      | 64,7%        | -1,9%         | -34,2%        | 25,7%        | 33,2%       |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>788</b>                 | <b>984</b> | <b>1.209</b> | <b>1.038</b> | <b>729</b> | <b>807</b> | <b>5.555</b> | <b>100,0%</b>           | <b>24,9%</b>               | <b>22,9%</b> | <b>-14,1%</b> | <b>-29,8%</b> | <b>10,7%</b> | <b>2,4%</b> |

Período até 1 de janeiro a 30 de junho de 2020 comparado ao mesmo período dos anos 2015 a 2019

Fontes consolidadas via Sistema Metadados: ITEP, DATASUS, DHPP, CIOSP, COINE e MPE

## MUNICIPALITIES POLES OF VIOLENCE

The municipalities treated as centers of violence are those that, due to their characteristics of population density, that is, have more than 100 thousand inhabitants in

2019. The municipalities of RN falling into this category are: Natal, Mossoró, Parnamirim and São Gonçalo do Amarante.

Regarding the type of lethal conduct in Natal, 76.2% of the occurrences in the first semesters from 2015 to 2020 were intentional homicides, followed by bodily injury followed by death (10.1%) and police intervention (8.2%). The growth of 58.3% of bodily injuries followed by death is noteworthy, between 2019 and 2020, although the absolute numbers of this type of occurrence are relatively small (Table 3).

**TABLE 3 – TYPES OF LETHAL CONDUCT IN NATAL**

| CVLIs no Rio Grande do Norte<br>Tipo De Conduta Letal Em Natal | Números absolutos de CVLIs |            |            |            |            |            |              | Incidência<br>2015-2020 | Variação entre os períodos |             |               |               |              |               |
|--|----------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
|  | 2015                       | 2016       | 2017       | 2018       | 2019       | 2020       | 2015-2019    |                         | 2015-2016                  | 2016-2017   | 2017-2018     | 2018-2019     | 2019-2020    | 2015-2020     |
| Homicídio Doloso   | 208                        | 255        | 234        | 170        | 96         | 108        | 1.071        | 76,2%                   | 22,6%                      | -8,2%       | -27,4%        | -43,5%        | 12,5%        | -48,1%        |
| Lesão Corporal Seguida De Morte                                | 18                         | 19         | 43         | 31         | 12         | 19         | 142          | 10,1%                   | 5,6%                       | 126,3%      | -27,9%        | -61,3%        | 58,3%        | 5,6%          |
| Intervencao Policial   | 5                          | 11         | 10         | 34         | 26         | 29         | 115          | 8,2%                    | 120,0%                     | -9,1%       | 240,0%        | -23,5%        | 11,5%        | 480,0%        |
| Latrocínio   | 8                          | 8          | 10         | 15         | 10         | 11         | 62           | 4,4%                    | 0,0%                       | 25,0%       | 50,0%         | -33,3%        | 10,0%        | 37,5%         |
| Feminicídio  | 1                          | 6          | 2          | 3          | 2          | 2          | 16           | 1,1%                    | 500,0%                     | -66,7%      | 50,0%         | -33,3%        | 0,0%         | 100,0%        |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>240</b>                 | <b>299</b> | <b>299</b> | <b>253</b> | <b>146</b> | <b>169</b> | <b>1.406</b> | <b>100,0%</b>           | <b>24,6%</b>               | <b>0,0%</b> | <b>-15,4%</b> | <b>-42,3%</b> | <b>15,8%</b> | <b>-29,6%</b> |


Período até 1 de janeiro a 30 de junho de 2020 comparado ao mesmo período dos anos 2015 a 2019

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
The spatialization of data on intentional lethal behavior in Natal shows that the neighborhood N. S Apresentação is the most violent, followed by Lagoa Azul and Felipe Camarão. And 6 other neighborhoods have between 46 and 95 intentional lethal violent behaviors (2015-2019). While the municipality of Mossoró, CVLIs vary between 1 and 85 occurrences, with Bairro Santo Antonio being the most violent in the period, followed by Aeroporto and Lagoa do Mato. Another five neighborhoods' CVLIs also stand out from 23 to 35, characterizing the northern and southern zones as the most violent (Maps 4 and 5).

These neighborhoods and localities have characteristics in common: great fragmented spatiality, that is, the absence of permanent and effective public health, education, sports, leisure and security policies; they have precarious communities in terms of housing, as well as difficulties in access, whether in terms of mobility or the presence of criminal factions that control drug trafficking in the area.

**MAP 3 – INCIDENCE BY NEIGHBORHOODS IN NATAL**







Regarding the type of lethal conduct in Mossoró, 83.6% of the occurrences in the first semesters of 2015 to 2020 were intentional homicides, followed by bodily injury followed by death (7.4%) and police intervention (3.7%). The 33.3% growth in bodily injuries followed by death is noteworthy between 2019 and 2020, although the absolute numbers for this type of occurrence are relatively small (Table 4).

Mossoró follows the pattern of medium-sized cities in the Brazilian Northeast, which, from 2010 to 2020, have been showing significant increases in the rates of violent deaths. In addition to demographic growth, unplanned urban expansion, and increased circulation of economic resources, these cities lacked an increase in the structure of public security, as well as in priority actions that targeted the target audience of this violence: youth.

**TABLE 4 – TYPES OF LETHAL CONDUCT IN MOSSORÓ**

| CVLIs no Rio Grande do Norte<br>Tipo De Conduta Letal Em Mossoró | Números absolutos de CVLIs |            |            |            |           |           |            | Incidência<br>2015-2020 | Variação entre os períodos |              |              |               |             |              |
|--|----------------------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|--------------|
|  | 2015                       | 2016       | 2017       | 2018       | 2019      | 2020      | 2015-2019  |                         | 2015-2016                  | 2016-2017    | 2017-2018    | 2018-2019     | 2019-2020   | 2015-2020    |
| Homicídio Doloso   | 62                         | 121        | 104        | 106        | 71        | 78        | 542        | 83,6%                   | 95,2%                      | -14,0%       | 1,9%         | -33,0%        | 9,9%        | 25,8%        |
| Lesão Corporal Seguida De Morte                                  | 2                          | 3          | 15         | 7          | 13        | 8         | 48         | 7,4%                    | 50,0%                      | 400,0%       | -53,3%       | 85,7%         | -38,5%      | 300,0%       |
| Lacração   | 2                          | 4          | 4          | 6          | 7         | 6         | 29         | 4,5%                    | 100,0%                     | 0,0%         | 50,0%        | 16,7%         | -14,3%      | 200,0%       |
| Intervenção Policial   | 5                          | 2          | 5          | 6          | 2         | 4         | 24         | 3,7%                    | -60,0%                     | 150,0%       | 20,0%        | -66,7%        | 100,0%      | -20,0%       |
| Feminicídio  | 1                          | 1          | 0          | 1          | 2         | 0         | 5          | 0,8%                    | 0,0%                       | -100,0%      | NA           | 100,0%        | -100,0%     | -100,0%      |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>72</b>                  | <b>131</b> | <b>128</b> | <b>126</b> | <b>95</b> | <b>96</b> | <b>648</b> | <b>100,0%</b>           | <b>81,9%</b>               | <b>-2,3%</b> | <b>-1,6%</b> | <b>-24,6%</b> | <b>1,1%</b> | <b>33,3%</b> |

Período até 1 de janeiro a 30 de junho de 2020 comparado ao mesmo período dos anos 2015 a 2019

Fontes consolidadas via Sistema Metadados: ITEP, DATASUS, DHPP, CIOSP, COINE e MPE

Regarding the type of lethal conduct, there is a prevalence of intentional homicide (79.5%), although there was a 10.9% reduction in this type of lethal conduct, between the first semesters of 2015 and 2019. For on the other hand, bodily injury followed by death, which represents 8.6% of occurrences, increased 89.7% in the period. Police intervention, which corresponds to 6.4% of the total, increased 117.9% in the same period.

When analyzing the means employed, firearms lead with 87.4% as armament and/or employed means, in addition to having increased by 4.9% of this employed in the period 2015-2020. Bladed weapons occupied the second option (7.0%), although there

was an important relative reduction in the period (-21.6%). It is worth mentioning the effective importance of controlling the use of firearms circulation. The trivialization of the possession of weapons, as well as the “social” overvaluation of possession, may contribute in the near future to the worsening of these indicators that are still quite worrying.

It is worth mentioning that there is a significant increase in access to firearms from 2018 to 2020, implying a greater circulation of this type of weapon among the population, as, once purchased, the firearm - in its majority - ends up going stop at the hands of perpetrators of crime, the fruit of robberies and assaults themselves.

Regarding the incidence by type of crime scene, public roads, hospitals and emergency rooms and homes, represent the locations of more than half of deaths in the period 2015-2020 (61.2%). While public roads were reduced by -26.9%, hospitals and emergency rooms and homes had an increase of 506% and 936%, respectively, a very worrying phenomenon that requires planning policies to combat this type of crime, in these locations.

The macro causes of violence can be understood as the causes that gave rise to the conflict that generates lethality, where the victim's contextualization, his social and criminal vulnerabilities can influence as an ignitor of violence (BEATO, 2008).

Order crimes are in the first position, with 38.7% of deaths between the first semesters of 2015 and 2020, and with an increase of 69% in the last year (despite a reduction in the quinquennium to the order of 8.6%). Attention is drawn to interpersonal violence in the second position (24.2% of occurrences), despite the reduction of 26.2% in the period. The third observed macro cause was drug trafficking (9.4%) followed by the police vs. crime conflict (7.5%). In the last two, there was a significant increase of 158.5% and 95.6% respectively.

The importance of family, with regard to the prevention of violence or its dissemination, is common sense in all discussions in the area. But, more than is commonly imagined, among preferred residents, family and its significance is an issue that appears with evidence in the processes and in interviews conducted on the subject. This is not exclusive to the popular world. But the way in which family ties are triggered suggests particularities that differ from the middle classes. It would be possible to say that the family seems to operate as private forms of social security in a scenario marked by the absence of social rights and protections.

Several researches suggest the existence of an intense interaction of the domestic group, as well as the extension of the bonds that articulate relatives, what anthropology calls "extended family". In the scenes of the conflicts that triggered death stories, there is almost always the presence of countless family members: father, mother, spouses, uncles, cousins, grandparents, brothers-in-law, sons-in-law and in-laws etc.

According to Ferreira (2006),

“(...) family networks are extensive and very active, and it is through them that families mobilize resources and intra-peer solidarity to face the common disruptions in life due to material difficulties. The question is important because it helps us to understand the presence of countless relatives in the same death story, and also the logic of conflicts that end in a violent solution” (p. 58).

Family networks involve the practice of intra-peer solidarity, but they are organized according to the differences in family roles and the expectations that each one will do what is due.

It is important to emphasize that it is not just the conventions that are at stake. Often, or almost always, it is the family organization itself that is in question, and the dispute over family prerogatives can also result in bloody plots.

“Homicides caused by domestic conflicts add to police statistics and make up the agenda for academic debates on the topic. However, for the residents these death stories are not always seen as violence. It is not in this register that these stories are told and evaluated” (FERREIRA, 2006, p. 68).


If no one hesitates to condemn and thus name violence in these cases, the violence that emerges as a fatal outcome of everyday litigation and the chance of life, seems to be part of the wheel of fortune over which no one is able to interfere. These homicides (stories of violent death) are crossed by moral suffering that cannot be elaborated outside the private codes of family life. And in this, it is the social conditions of a vulnerability that threatens life projects and undermines the efforts undertaken to build a plausible order of life, which also lacks language to be named. The whole issue of disenfranchisement is inscribed in these everyday stories and in the "futile motives" that trigger "death plots".

Many of the homicides and death stories, in the sertão, in the Northeast or even in Brazil, are permeated by revenge and family disputes that reproduce in endless "vendettas". Understanding the familiar role in these plots and their networks helps to understand a little, perhaps, of this homicidal dynamic.

Regarding lethality in police intervention, 95.2% of the occurrences were in confrontation with military policemen, a phenomenon related to the role of military policemen in ostensive policing, in parallel to the concentration of violence on public roads.

The victimization of public security professionals accounted for half of the occurrences of military police officers (49.1%), followed by retired military police officers (29.1%). Unfortunately, the 2015-2020 period was marked by a 66.7% increase in this type of occurrence.

**GRAPHIC 1 – INCIDENCE BY VICTIMIZATION OF PUBLIC SAFETY PROFESSIONALS**



## ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The results presented show a complex scenario of violence, of an increase in CVLIs in the first half of 2020 compared to the same period of the previous year (10.7%). With almost 9 (nine) people victims of intentional lethal violence every two days, a smaller number would be expected, given that the population of Rio Grande do Norte is

experiencing a period of social distance created by the governor and some mayors to stop the advance of the world pandemic of COVID-19.

If, on the one hand, it is important to put in context the impact of the pandemic and the overload of the public security system, it is important to consider that the reduction in the levels of violence in Rio Grande do Norte, observed between 2017 and 2019, had much more related to the peak of violence that occurred in 2017 than properly a structured reduction of violence, resulting from the implementation of public security policies and investment.

On the contrary, the public security system has for years been weakened by the lack of human capital and investment by governments. Another important point, in addition to the relative reductions in occurrences, concerns the level of violence reached in recent years.

In other words, even considering the reduction in CVLIs between 2017 and 2019, the number of occurrences in 2019, in absolute numbers, represents an extremely high, if not unacceptable, level of violence in our State: 1,451 victims lost their lives resulting from violence in the previous year, of which 729 were in the first half. And now, in the first half of 2020, we see an increase of 78 deaths in the same 6-month period; that is, 807 people were killed as a result of the violence, which represents more than 4 homicides a day, between January and June this year.

**TABLE 5- CVLIs GENERAL SUMMARY TABLE IN THE 1ST SEMESTER**

| <b>Resumo Geral</b>                                       | <b>2015</b> | <b>2016</b> | <b>2017</b> | <b>2018</b> | <b>2019</b> | <b>2020</b> |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Vítimas (Números absolutos)</i>                        | 788         | 984         | 1.209       | 1.038       | 729         | 807         |
| <i>Vítimas (Por grupo de 100 mil habitantes)</i>          | 11,61       | 14,37       | 17,52       | 14,92       | 10,39       | 11,42       |
| <i>Variação em relação ao ano anterior</i>                | -54,1%      | 24,9%       | 22,9%       | -14,1%      | -29,8%      | 10,7%       |
| <i>Vidas poupadas/perdidas em relação ao ano anterior</i> | -113        | 196         | 225         | -171        | -309        | 78          |
| <i>Taxa de mortalidade diária no 1º semestre</i>          | 4,33        | 5,41        | 6,64        | 5,70        | 4,01        | 4,43        |

Período até 1 de janeiro a 30 de junho de 2020 comparado ao mesmo período dos anos 2015 a 2019

Fontes consolidadas via Sistema Metadados: ITEP, DATASUS, DHPP, CIOSP, COINE e MPE

Therefore, much more than percentage increases or decreases, the scenario is unfortunately that of a pandemic, whose struggle has been lost for years, and whose prediction is that this tragedy will unfortunately continue in the near future. If we consider the different crises that we have experienced in recent years - of a political, economic and public health nature - the tendency is that we do not have significant investments in the area of public security, which in turn are fundamental for the proper fight against violence in the State of Rio Grande do Norte.

The profile of the tragedy is known: 94% are men, of these 88% are black, one third between 18 and 24 years old, 71% single, with low education (32.5% with elementary education, a proportion that tends to be much higher, considering the ignored data), and more than half without paid activity (52.4%), and concentrated in the Metropolitan Region (55.2%), despite the recent increase observed in the interior, and with the aggravating increase in occurrences in hospitals and emergency rooms, as well as inside homes.

In addition to the need to increase public security investment, it is necessary to think about new actions that are integrated with other sectors, such as access to better education (more inclusive and of higher quality), access to the labor market and minimum

income for vulnerable populations (especially in the context of the pandemic); in addition to the need to adopt actions focused on critical areas, with a high incidence of crime.

The occurrence rates show the density of violence in metropolitan cities (in addition to Mossoró and some interior towns), where the absence of the State, expressed by the lack of basic infrastructure services (such as sanitation, schools, etc.), aggravate the scenario of vulnerability of the population, and consequently, the increase in violence, which requires planned actions in these locations.

Violence is configured as a form of language and as a social norm for some social categories, in contrast to the so-called "civilized" norms, guided by self-control and institutionalized social control. In Brazil, a society in the process of "globalization", there is a plurality of different types of social norms, which can be seen there as a simultaneous pattern of conduct that is often divergent and incompatible.

Thus, we are faced with a form of sociability (or anti sociability) a violence which is configured as a control device, open and continuous. It would be the social relationship of excess of power that prevents the recognition of the other - individual, class, gender or race - through the use of force or coercion, causing some type of damage, the tearing of their citizenship, and configuring the opposite of possibilities of contemporary democratic society. It also involves a multipurpose range of material, bodily and symbolic dimensions acting specifically in coercion with damage that takes effect.

Society, in general, does not recognize that adolescents are in a process of transition to adulthood, when their aggressiveness is necessary for them to find a place in the social space. Young people have probably lacked this recognition on the part of socializing institutions: it is about highlighting the break in the sense of school as a socialization device for life and work, as well as the need to build social recognition for young people, for the affirmation of their self-esteem and their social prestige in society.

We are experiencing a true juvenile "genocide": young people, blacks/browns, poor, with low schooling and residents of peripheries. The profile changes little and has changed in these three decades. Between the ages of 16 and 24, the bulk of the victims are consuming themselves. As for the perpetrators, this can almost also be considered the profile. The problem is that our homicides are hardly investigated. When they are, few investigations are successful. We have a picture of homicides perpetrated by the State itself and its agents that is difficult to investigate. This analytical vacuum is costly for Brazil and its future.

Thus, we have a pessimistic scenario, if we consider the difficulties that governments will face in the coming years to solve all the social problems aggravated by the pandemic and the economic crisis, and which would be strategic for the effective (integrated) fight against persistent violence in the State.

## FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

After all, did the pandemic bring any extra obstacles to the increase in CVLI occurrences? The answer is yes, and we can list several reasons such as:

1. *In the peripheries and slums, violence, prevented from being isolated, becomes daily and familiar, where the only weapon against it is to allow promiscuity and habit to weave networks of conformism. Today there is a fatalistic "naturalness" about the coexistence between wealth and poverty (inequality), as if these were a necessary condition of the way of being of human Society;*

2. *Violence is eminently social. But here, due to social violence, we refer to acts that affect specific social groups or specific segments. Hence, each society practices specific types of violence, according to its culture and corporate model. Poverty, infant mortality, very low educational levels, illiteracy, lack of basic sanitation, slums, poor health, unemployment, etc., are examples of this type of violence and where income becomes an important element to be considered;*
3. *The dynamics of violence have diversified in terms of criminal **modus operandis**, that is, there is a strong adaptation of criminal groups in seeking other means of obtaining illicit gain in times of pandemic, such as games, quarrels, armed robbery, looting, loan sharking and others;*
4. *Criminal groups are taking advantage of the human resources susceptibility of public security forces, using this moment to intensify territorial disputes, to engage in revenge against adversaries who were not timely, and to engage in confrontations with police;*
5. *A very aggravating situation is the absence of the Federal Government's role in providing swift aid to states, including in relation to isolation, increasing insecurity and civil disrespect, which would be essential to mitigate the proliferation of the virus and encourage isolation which would result in a relief from the overload of the health system and also in the reduction of intentional lethal behaviors;*
6. *A crime reduction equation could be paralleled with traffic accidents, less traffic between cities resulted in fewer deaths and fewer accidents, if there were fewer people in the daily flow and return and in search of livelihood, less would be obtained exposure to virus action and criminal action;*
7. *The lack of role of the Federal Government in providing quick assistance to those less assisted is another factor that encourages people to take to the streets in search of sustenance, breaking with the isolation precisely in urban concentrations where both the virus and crime are spread: open fairs, public transport, concentrations of street sales and, as a result, the population's vulnerability is increasing, including the actions of criminality.*

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