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## HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY OF THE SECOND DISORDER IN RUSSIA

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**Abstract:** *The blatant evidence of the rural nature of the way of life in Russia became the reason for the actualization of the agrarian issue in the political projects of the empire, and also gave rise to a significant number of interpreters and projectors in the educated strata of society who labored in the field of rural life "improvement", which, since the time of the Great Reforms, has become a kind of a national hobby, which constituted the trend of the discursive formation of domestic modernization. Liberals and guards, writers and engineers suddenly felt the need to either take (Marx & Engels): "... a significant part of the population from the idiocy of village life", or include (Trotsky) "the peasant in the general system of socialist economy". However, "...a fatal blow to agricultural backwardness, the barbaric isolation of the peasant and the idiocy of village life" was still assumed in the finale (Trotsky).*

**Keywords:** *peasantry, agrarian issue, Troubles, perestroika depression, historical discourse.*

## INTRODUCTION

This concern became an element of the cultural tradition of Russia, adopting the image of the so-called "agrarian issue", the content of which was determined in the course of political discussions, the subject of which had little in common with the parameters of the Russian pastoral. It remained, in a way, the quintessence of political polemics until 1906, when the place of sluggish men in the forefront of political combatants was transferred to the proletarians by the general agreement of the progressive public, and the villagers were given up. More surprising was the peasant resistance during the period of the Red Troubles, when the indifference of the "great dumb" almost ended with the final dismantling of the newly modernized social structure. At the same time, the communist authorities consistently blocked all attempts to interpret the chronology of the Second Russian Troubles adequately and determine the place of peasant communities in its collisions. However, even now, when A.V. Chayanov's works were rehabilitated, and also recognized as the classics of the agrarian theory, his conclusions are not seriously demanded by historical science - the discursive matrix of Russian history, in its current form, does not accept other interpretations of the human tragedy (11) of the first quarter of the last century. In this sense, the history of the communal revolution concept is indicative: formulated in 1993, it was identified in 1997 as one of the most interesting and promising, and it remained in this status for almost a quarter of a century (Pivovarov), until it was carelessly implanted into the megadiscourse of the Great Russian revolution, the experience of indoctrination of which convincingly testifies to the optimistic ability of the scientific and historical community to reject clearly unviable concepts. However, one should not exaggerate the importance of research practices for the existence of society.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The absence of painful self-reflection and the sense of unity provide the mass consciousness with the ability to evaluate quickly and more or less unambiguously, including, historical complexes, thus maintaining social consensus and social stability, while the possibility of verifying and operationalizing by concepts is not a necessary condition for discourse legitimization. This circumstance favorably distinguishes the discursive formation of consciousness from the scientific research, within which it is customary to study not only the phenomenon itself, but also its existence in the mass consciousness in recent decades, and, as was shown by relatively recent studies, they almost failed to find a stable correlation between them. Simply put, the truth, like a hundred years ago, remains the goal of a few, while most are content with accessible presentations, in which the main thing is "to tell everything well"; only the authoritative aplomb has noticeably diminished in the edifying note of science, after two world wars: rational explanations, as it turned out, still do not guarantee a solution to the problem. However, even when it comes to an objective assessment and a professional approach, we only mean a change of lenses. For example, a look from the 70s-80s recedes before the point of view of the 90-ies; and not because a certain truth of being was revealed to mankind at the turn of the century, but simply as the result of researcher generation rotation: historiography (4) "subsides", the "thaw" pathos disappears (1), and the perestroika depression gives way to an annoying, although transient dichotomy of the

Soviet / post-Soviet, well, and ... a lot more everything and different.

At the same time, perhaps the most noticeable novelty in the research tradition is the understanding that value conformism (8), which accepts the conventions of new truths, is not a denial of the desire for its comprehension, performing the function of an inevitable error when they set up research optics. Moreover, as the scale increases - by expanding the horizon of the historical perspective - the value of visual effects is minimized, that is, it is easier to assess objectively the results of the Northern War or the Great Reforms than the results of collectivization or the consequences of the New Thought policy. From this point of view, the dramatic collisions of the early twentieth century, which turned into the collapse of a thousand-year empire and social experiments within the framework of a local communist project, become a full-fledged object of historical research, although their political and cultural implications remain not fully clarified. Simply put, the mass consciousness (as shown by the results of professional surveys dedicated to the centenary of the 17th year) is not agitated by revolutionary issues (10), which opens room for professional analysis.

Meanwhile, the attempts to comprehend objectively the Second Russian Troubles were consistently undertaken "hot on the heels" of the Soviet regime collapse. However, the results obtained at that time at the forefront of the breakthrough were not accepted by the professional community, and individuals who had broken away from the main forces have been holding a defense perimeter for a quarter of a century, waiting for the community to get used seriously to the discourses of the Troubles, communal revolution, color terror and mass brutality. However, this secondary reflection has its own reason: if at the end of the twentieth century, historical discourse played the role of summing up, now it serves as the basis for new perspective comprehension, which, while maintaining the content, requires some change in the observer's position and the arrangement of a new set of issues designed to unite the streams of the signified and the signifier into a single whole. Simply put, we are talking about the transformation of what is commonly called a discursive formation. After nothing was discovered behind the wide open doors of the archives that would allow once and for all to "close" the painful questions of Russian history (Well, except, perhaps, understanding that this is how it should be), the illusion of common truths gave way to the skill of logical interpretation again, which, in fact, is a sign of professional maturity - the quality that allows the historical community to maintain the unity of national history discourse, the presence of which provides an opportunity to satisfy research needs and to fabricate internally consistent scenarios of the past, and which also turns out to be no less important, to satisfy the curiosity of the general public in need of implementation the project of their own identity.

If this pathetic presentation is somewhat reduced, then the issue of the prospects and possibilities of society turns out to be linked with reflection on the historical conditions in which it exists, and the geography of this cultural space, in turn, is mediated by the historical experience that society has at its disposal, as well as the popular idea about its content. And although the objective content of historical memory and the idea of its volume is seriously different, the task of the scientific and pedagogical community is that they do not contradict each other. At least in terms of basic parameters. Otherwise, as the experience of Glasnost has shown, a critical mass of contradictions provokes the social structure rupture, which is fatal for the fate of the social organism. In this sense, the aporia of today lies in the existence of a noticeable discrepancy between the level of objective historical knowledge achieved by the

beginning of the 21st century and popular ideas about the past, which are the product of a vulgar and unsystematic reduction of the professional discourse content. In practice, this means the presence of such questions about the past, the answers to which do not correspond to the needs of the cultural community. The mass consciousness generally does not accept complex presentations and dialectical conclusions that are implicitly generated by the research community within the framework of the cognitive process.

Among such "sensitive" topics is the interpretation of the historical meaning of the Second Russian Troubles, which is read through the well-known definition by S.F. Platonov on the "connivance" of the peasantry, as the main condition for the existence of Soviet power (I explain the existence of Soviet power by the fact that this happened thanks to the connivance of the peasantry, and therefore I am sure that the peasantry will be the dominant force in front of the working class). This issue, in principle, cannot be resolved from the standpoint of economic or sociological determinism, since it has not yet been possible to operationalize the concept of the peasantry, or to isolate specific peasant types of economic activity (8). In fact, this does not make much sense, because the intervention of the entire peasantry was not required: the deed was done by the end of 1919, in the Volga region and the Urals, where the peasantry, having provided the Bolsheviks with food and human resources, gave the opportunity for the Leninist government to survive a critical period and begin the formation of the institutional structures for the proletarian dictatorship. After that, the most significant factor in the enthronement of the Soviets was the lack of resources and political will of their opponents. Belated revolts were brutally suppressed by the new masters of the country, who, after impressive demonstrations of their iron will and unyielding determination in 1920-1921, broke the resistance of the Earth and were able to begin the systematic organization of political institutions. The fact that this result did not correspond to the political program of the Leninists was not decisive from the "village bell tower". They did not coincide with political trends and the scenarios of social dramas unfolding in the North, Siberia and the Far East. The captivating plot of the peasant epic in Central Asia, which is almost undisclosed, but obviously textbook example of moral and economic resistance, could not have a decisive influence on the establishment of the Bolshevik dictatorship in the country.

A persistent mistrust in relation to the measures of the Soviet government was gradually established in the countryside as a result of the consistent frustration by communist administrators of the traditional moral and economic rules of the social contract and the interests of their rural partners. This skepticism was eliminated only by the beginning of the thirties, as a side effect of the independent mechanism of the survival ethics elimination, which for centuries had provided economic activity and generated the meaning of life of the villagers. The replacement of the structures of peasant self-government by state and party ones, not burdened with the guarantees of survival ethics, led to the "zombification" of agriculture, which throughout the entire period of communist rule showed complete apathy, transforming the institutions of mutual assistance of the rural world into the strategy of social dependence, most fully implemented in state farms, the survival which was guaranteed by state subsidies and personal connections of individual leaders.

## CONCLUSIONS

In general, throughout the entire Second Russian Troubles, the peasantry was

unable to realize, formulate and defend their political interests. Therefore, the social-class definition can be applied to it only according to the "residual" principle. On the other hand, it was the peasant "connivance", that is, the unwillingness to be distracted from the "robbery", the inability to identify political challenges and the lack of coordination skills that prevented the Russian peasantry from fleeing the state (5) to the country of peasant utopia (4), the conquest of which was planned and carried out by the new rulers of Russia (6) whose role was assumed by the Bolsheviks, - so decisively that the prospects for practically free food requisitions, tax and human mobilizations, which allowed the communists to prepare for a new act of struggle for the world revolution opened up ten years after the communal revolution. In such a bizarre - "purely Russian" way, the comedy of Russian monarchy dismantling turned into a prologue to the communist tyranny drama.

### Conflict of interest

Authors confirm that the submitted data do not contain the conflict of interests.

### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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### REFERENCES

1. "I explain the existence of Soviet power by the fact that this happened thanks to the connivance of the peasantry, and therefore I am sure that the peasantry will be the dominant force in front of the working class," - this prediction made by him at the insistence of OGPU investigators (Academic case of 1929 -1931. The documents and materials of the investigation case fabricated by the OGPU. - SPb., 1993. p. 30.). S.F. Platonov was skeptical about the prospects of social forecasts. In any case, he believed that the Russian historian "cannot be directly guided by this ideal." (See: Platonov S.F. "Lectures on Russian history". - Petrozavodsk, 1996. p. 9).
2. Against the background of the social tectonics of the Nineties, the brutal discussion of the sixties about the differences between the poorest and poor peasantry is perceived as a pointless scholastic debate.
3. Alexander, C. Travel of my brother Alexei to the country of peasant utopia [Electronic resource] / Travel of my brother Alexey to the country of peasant utopia / Electronic library RoyalLib.com. - Access mode: [https://royallib.com/book/chayanov\\_aleksandr/puteshestvie\\_moego\\_brata\\_alekseya\\_v\\_stranu\\_krestyanskoy\\_utopii.html](https://royallib.com/book/chayanov_aleksandr/puteshestvie_moego_brata_alekseya_v_stranu_krestyanskoy_utopii.html).
4. Few people are interested in understanding the historiographic nuances and semitones of the late Soviet period, so this whole tradition is profaned and ignored, often unreasonably.
5. James, C. (1998). *Scott Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. - Yale: Yale University Press, - 445 p.
6. Lyukshin, D.I. (2006). *Second Russian Troubles: Peasant Dimension*. - M.: AIRO-XXI, - 144 p.

7. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2018). The Manifesto of the Communist Party [Electronic resource] / Esperanto. - Access mode: <http://www.esperanto.mv.ru/Marksismo/Manifesto/manifesto.html#n1>.
8. Perhaps the only adequate definition of the peasantry is still the one proposed by T. Shanin: "peasants are small agricultural producers who, using simple tools and the labor of their family members, work - directly or indirectly - to satisfy their own consumer needs and fulfill obligations in relation to the owners of political and economic power" (Shanin T. The concept of the peasantry. Great stranger: peasants and farmers in the modern world. M., 1992. p.11).
9. Pivovarov, Yu.S. *The origins and meaning of the Russian revolution*. Site. Magazine "Golden Lion", 162 - publication of Russian conservative thought. [http://www.zlev.ru/162/162\\_28.htm#\\_ftn1](http://www.zlev.ru/162/162_28.htm#_ftn1).
10. The discussion about the possibility / necessity of social reconciliation between "whites" and "reds", which was attempted in 2016, did not take place. Although, we are talking here, perhaps, not about the miraculous self-healing of society, but about the formation of a traumatic core. However, for good or for worse, the discourse of the civil war is not supported by mass consciousness.
11. The image was introduced by O. Figes in his monograph (See: Figes O. A people's tragedy. The Russian Revolution 1891-1924. - Sydney: PIMLICO, 1996. - 924 p.), translated into twenty languages (among which Russian is not included), and constituting one of the key elements of the postmodern discourse in the history of the Second Russian Troubles. However, this text is almost unknown to Russian historians.
12. Trotsky, L. (1925). *New economic policy. Works. V. 12.* - Moscow-Leningrad, [Electronic resource]. Access mode: <http://www.souz.info/library/trotsky/trotm221.htm>.
13. Well, except, perhaps, understanding that this is how it should be.