

## DETERMINING SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE PERSON IN THE REGION: INFORMATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

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**Abstract:** The significance of this research is that the developing information society poses increasing threats to social security of the person, associated with the dissemination information that is may be harmful to both the individual's life and development and the surrounding society. Immediate threat comes from cyberspace. In this regard, research has so far focused on the informational and psychological aspects of the individual's security, whereas indicators for assessing them have not yet been fully analyzed. This article aims to examine the informational and psychological aspects of social security of the person in Kemerovo Oblast. Indicators for assessing social security of the person were discussed. The 3,000 respondents included university, college and high school students residing in Kemerovo Oblast, since this portion of society is most easily influenced and psychologically unstable. A survey and regional monitoring data on extremist manifestations were used to identify the types of threats and to assess their influence on the individual. An assessment was made of the indicators of social security of the person in terms of psychological and informational aspects. Information provided on the official websites of federal and regional authorities and of the Federal Security Service in Kemerovo Oblast as well as relevant theoretical research studies were used to determine the level of social protection of the public in the region. The results of the study identified the following psychological and informational threats to social security of the person: mind control, incitement to extremism, promotion of false ideas and values, misinformation, defamation and presentation of false facts about Russian history. Overall, social security of the person was determined as satisfactory in the region. The impact of the mentioned threats on the individual, albeit not a significant one, has nonetheless potential for growth. Social security of the person in the region was found to be sufficiently high to control and constrain the extremist behaviors and manifestations without, however, preventing them. This necessitates developing more effective measures for working with the population, including the young people, which are aimed at forming protection mechanisms in the person's mind. The materials of this article are of practical value for conducting related research in other regions and for putting forward recommendations with respect to ensuring social security of the person in the discussed aspects.

**Keywords:** social security, informational and psychological security, mind control, extremism.

## Introduction

A human being is the primary social security actor. His life, health, property, rights and freedoms are the essential conditions needed for a fulfilling and productive life and for the safe development of the state and society. According to Laroque (7, p. 24), the developing information, whose main products are information and knowledge, poses increasing threats to social security of the person and society, which are associated with mind control, incitement to extremism and promotion of false ideas and values, among others. These circumstances did not go unnoticed and activated, in Russia, both its scientific (identification of threats, diagnosis, evaluation of the effectiveness of social security, etc.), and practical potential to ensure social security of the person from internal and external threats. Researchers define security of the person as a type of social relations, in which protection of the life, health, physical integrity and freedom of every individual and citizen is guaranteed. Furthermore, security of the person refers to the guaranteed protection of the individual's vital interests, allowing him to make full use of his physical and intellectual potential both to his own advantage and for the purpose of promoting social and public interests (5, pp. 22-24; 9, pp. 240-243). Social security of the person means stable protection of the individual's vital personal interests from internal and external challenges and threats that may arise in all spheres of his life activities. As Kingson and Schulz noted, this situation is interconnected with and interdependent on actions of security actors directed at ensuring security (11, pp. 154-155).

In their turn, the indicators of social security characterize the level of social protection of the public in terms of a wide range of human values, rights and freedoms. These include the individual's legitimate interests, the protection of assets and intangibles, such as free time and the right to participate in governance, of honor and dignity of people as members of the civilized society (12, pp. 31-48). Social security of the person also refers to a comprehensive system of measures taken by the state with a view to maintain a decent standard of living for its citizens and to take care of the groups who are unable to provide it for themselves (36). To meet this need, a scientific and educational area, known as 'health and safety', has been developed. Its theoretical framework includes the concept of the 'behaviorally safe personality'. Such an individual can foresee the effects of threats to peace and security, understands present-day issues relating to human life and activities and their historical importance and seeks to address these issues by intelligently combining personal and social interests (17). Shershnev believes that, in shaping the behaviorally safe personality, it is necessary to make the individual feel the need to analyze the internal environment of his habitat and his personal, spiritual and psychological space, in other words, to consider the social aspect of security (38).

A regular assessment of social security of the person in Russian regions is necessary to ensure the most effective social security of the person and to shape the behaviorally safe personality. This will reveal real and potential threats to safety, the sources of such threats, the mechanisms for carrying out these threats (for example, manipulative technologies) and develop countermeasures to ensure and maintain safety in the region, which is the objective of the present study. Developing the behaviorally safe personality will create an intelligent, safe and caring society capable of ensuring social security, among others, by taking preventive measures rather than combating the effects of these threats. Research has two traditional approaches to the definition of social security of the person. The first one emphasizes human security in emergency situations,

while the second one highlights the individual's protection from manipulative informational influences. This study adopts the second approach (36).

Kislyakov's research (17) on the typology of the components of social security of the person and the information provided by other typologies (16, p. 56; 28) were used to establish a comprehensive typology that includes every possible component concerning all spheres human activities. According to this typology, the following are the types or components of social security of the person: psychological security, secure social interaction, security in socially dangerous/extreme situations, moral and spiritual security, informational and intellectual security, physical (reproductive, genetic, medical, etc.) security, civil and legal security, secure military service, historical security, ecological security, food security and economic safety. Improving social security of the person in all of the above-mentioned areas implies the development of methods enhancing its ability to resist various kinds of threats (8; 4; 1; 6). An analysis of different typologies of social security of the person revealed that almost all of them contain informational and psychological security components which can be considered as the most stable and undisputed ones. These components are the ones that connect the individual to the outer world and facilitate feedback mechanisms. Often, an individual who lost to some extent his social security, especially in psychological terms, also undermines the security of other individuals, and the information sector contributes largely to this.

Psychological security of the person is represented by the individual's ability to remain stable in a specific environment that may include psycho-traumatic and destructive internal and external influences. Psychological security is the psychic immunity of an individual characterized by the absence of danger both for the psyche and on the part of the individual's mental state. Psychological security is a combination of goal-oriented measures aimed at eliminating danger and taking into account the mental specificities of an individual. Bayeva points out the following three aspects of psychological security: security as a process, security as a state/condition and security as an individual property. The latter implies personal protection from destructive impacts (14, pp. 173-189).

According to Kodzhaspirov, the following psychological reasons explain the emergence of social dangers: low level of professional training in security issues; insufficient training in the culture of security; little importance given to security procedures; access to hazardous activities of individuals belonging to risk groups; individual fatigue or other psychic conditions affecting the security of their activity; aggression (18, pp. 36-42). The sources of psychological effect subdivided as follows: traditional sources: mental violence in the form of threats, narcotic or other psychotropic substances; non-traditional and artificial sources, i.e. factors resulting from human activities, emerging from social relations and associated with them. These include informational influence; physical and mental influence, deviations in social psychology, social conflicts/revolutions, stress, international dissention; managerial actions causing conflicts; restriction of the behavior of individuals through social control such as police, the court, imprisonment and army service; implication in highly dangerous activities and more (43, pp.162-168).

Psychological security of the person is of dual nature and, thus, can be either social or individual. Individual psychological security comprises mental processes that are studied by psychopathology and defectopsychology and capable of causing harm to the life and health of both the specific individual and others. From a social point of view, psychological security aims to prevent and eliminate or neutralize abnormal psychic

phenomena that may harm (2, pp. 331-354) both individuals in a group and the entire group.

Among the major characteristics of mature psychological security are the following: meaningful affections related to the ability to establish close emotional relationships; successful adaptation attributed to psycho-emotional stability, satisfaction, absence of distress and threat perceptions. These characteristics are representative of the following: psychological protection, communicative competency as the ability to communicate effectively and easily; the inner mindset/attitude to act in a certain manner; real environmental security (14, pp. 38-41). The concept of mental health is closely related to that of psychological security. Mental health is the mental state of an individual that allows him to behave in a socially satisfactory manner. Mental health represents the ultimate outcome of psychological security.

Grachev defines psychological security as protection of one's psyche from the effects of various informational barriers obstructing or complicating the formation and functioning, first, of an information-oriented framework for one's social life in modern society and, second, of a set of one's individual and subjective-individual relations with the surrounding world and oneself (15, p. 33). This definition implies a close relationship between psychological and informational security. Informational security of the person means the informational protection of fundamental interests of the individual including his vital, physical, psychological, genetic, reproductive, intellectual and spiritual interests (21, pp. 252-257). Informational security deals with informational interests of the individual and includes not only protection of information but also protection from certain types of information and access to the necessary information.

On the whole, information is necessary for each individual to behave adequately. Of special importance to the individual is social information, since it is the most widespread means of communication and influence. Always exposed to this or that informational field, people are in constant energy-informational communication with their environment. The individual has intelligence, consciousness, free will, conscience and responsibility and, thus, builds his relationships with the surrounding world by obtaining the necessary information from it, by providing others with his own information resources, such as knowledge and skills, and by protecting himself from the obviously harmful information influence (3, p.144). Informational security of the person means the person's right to receive objective information and implies that the information obtained from various sources does not interfere with the free formation and development of his personality.

The following factors may influence the personality: targeted pressure aimed at changing one's worldview, political views, moral and psychological conditions; dissemination of unreliable, distorted or incomplete information; the use of inadequate perceptions of reliable information by individuals (27). Informational influences are considered negative if they generate psycho-emotional and socio-psychological tensions, distortion of moral norms and criteria, moral and political disorientation and, as a consequence, inadequate behavior of individuals or groups of people. Another possible threat is mind control. Currently, the mass media and the Internet are among the major mind control tools, as they promote antihuman values such as terror, national and racial dislikes conducive to religious conflicts and extremism (24, pp. 133-141).

All of the above creates a need for research into informational and psychological implications of security of the person understood as the protection of the individual psyche from the effects of negative information factors that may result in the deformation

of human psyche and behavior. Ensuring informational and psychological security of the person is associated with his awareness of possible negative informational and psychological influences and his development of self-defense skills. Also, the individual must be knowledgeable about the goals, methods and means of present-day mind control and be able to control his exposure to external influences.

### **Objectives**

In view of the above, this research study aims to examine the level of social security of the person in Russia's Kemerovo Oblast in terms of informational and psychological security. This research will determine the indicators for the social well-being of people residing in the region, will detect the threats to social security of the person and the extent of their influence on the individual, as well as to identify the degree of personal security in Kemerovo Oblast. In this regard, the study will produce recommendations for safeguarding against possible threats to social security of the person in terms of information and psychology and will develop technologies to counter emerging threat to security and thus create conditions conducive to the existence of the behaviorally safe personality. Hypothesis: The level of social security of the person in Russian regions depends on the impact of existing threats and on the effectiveness of counteractive measures.

### **Methods**

Today, mind control and deformation as well as the dissemination of harmful, destructive and potentially false information as incitement to extremism are among the major trends posing threats to social security of the person in terms of informational and psychological security. In this context, the present study of social security of the person is based on the data obtained from relevant sources. In the autumn 2017, the authors conducted a study with a view to evaluate social security of the person in Kemerovo Oblast. For this purpose, the study drew upon the results of social network monitoring project (VKontakte, Facebook, Odnoclassniki, Twitter, and Instagram) headed by V. Shiller (41, pp. 44-56; 40, pp. 41-52) and upon the results of a survey. Theoretical studies and related research were initially used to determine indicators and benchmarks for evaluating personal social well-being. Research on the identification of threats posed to social security of the person and their influence on the individual was carried out by means of questionnaires and social network monitoring. The present study takes into consideration the level of development of this or that tool to measure how serious these threats are. Our research is based on the data obtained from the questionnaire, videos, photographs and textual extremism-related content available in popular Russian and foreign social networks. Counting the number of "likes" and "reposts" helped us determine the most popular content. The degree of social security of the person was investigated by assessing the extent and effectiveness of security measures undertaken in Kemerovo Oblast. To this end, the study used the data available on the official websites of federal, regional and local authorities and of the main Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, including Kemerovo Oblast; data gathered through local mass media and social networks were also analyzed. Indicators and benchmarks were evaluated by comparing them with similar data obtained in other regions.

The participants were selected from the university, college and high school students (around 3000 respondents) as they represent the most active, and easily subjected to the outer influence population segment (this factor determined the selection

of participants). It is assumed that young people are maximalist, which is conducive to aggression and extremism in times of acute social crisis. Radical views and beliefs are more easily formed in the youth environment which is more susceptible to destructive influences and, undoubtedly, threatens the individual's existence and development. The sample is random and stratified/differentiated. The following higher and special education institutions as well as high schools in Kemerovo Oblast served as a basis for empirical research: Kemerovo State University, Kemerovo State Agricultural Institute, Kemerovo Professional Technical School, General Education School No. 12 in Belovo, General Education School No. 23 in the town of Mezhdurechensk, Kemerovo Classical Lyceum, General Education School No. 2 in the village of Yaya Village, among others. In total, forty educational institutions participated in the research project. In order to maintain confidentiality, the list of all educational institutions that participated in the questionnaire is not publicly available. Only the educational institutions already mentioned in Shiller's publications are given as an example.

## Results

Research findings point to the following threats, including the ones described before: mind control (through indoctrination of false ideas and values, misinformation, slander and misinterpretation of facts from Russian history, etc.), promotion of antihuman values, incitement to extremism, creation of extremist organizations and propagation of their ideas. These informational treats related to political extremism and terrorism cause moral, material and socio-psychological harm to the population in general and to its particular groups or individuals (31). The poorly controlled Internet network hosts a significant number of easily vulnerable virtual venues, specifically various social networks, aimed at transmitting destructive ideas.

These threats could be ranked as external threats for individuals and as internal threats for the state. According to other typologies, these threats are due to specific political, economic and social factors and can be classified as follows: anthropogenic (by type of hazard source); informational (by type of 'life streams'; maximum permissible (by volume of 'life streams'); predictable (by emergence of a threat); periodic (by duration of exposure to a danger); affecting the individual (by objects of negative influence); individual and group (by number of people exposed to danger); interregional (by size of the danger exposure area); insensible (by individual ability to sense danger); harmful (by negative effects on the individual); mostly possible (by eventual impact on the individual and his habitat). These threats concern parties in social relationships, such as persons and entities, whose activities expose them to the above threats.

The authors developed the system of indicators and benchmarks in accordance with the outlined threats and with a view to assess the informational and psychological aspects of social security of the person in Russia's Kemerovo Oblast. The following points served as indicators. The informational aspect represents the degree of information security ensuring vitally important interests (benchmarks: distorted historical facts, dissemination of knowingly false information obstructing the individual's normal formation and development. Another indicator is the level of protection from destructive information inciting to extremism and terrorism (benchmarks: information pressure aims to change one's mindset, political views, moral and psychological state). The psychological aspect illustrates how protected one's psyche is from the effects of informational factors that obstruct or complicate the formation of a normal information-oriented basis for the individual's social behavior (benchmarks: the level of existing

extremist paradigms; presence of extremist elements in the minds of young people, including distorted moral norms and criteria, moral and political disorientation as represented by their adherence or positive attitudes towards destructive religious and pseudo-religious cults, Nazi ideology, the leaders of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, public demonstration of Nazi attributes and symbols, along with negative attitudes towards particular national minorities). Yet another indicator is individual resistance to destructive external and internal influences (benchmark: the number of young people exposed to extremist influences, mind control and promotion of antihuman values.) The study also assessed the level of social security of the person in the region by using the following benchmarks: anti-extremist measures carried out by law enforcement agencies and other organizations and their effectiveness in Kemerovo Oblast; the number of extremist organizations in Kemerovo Oblast or of extremist organizations involving the region's residents; the number of registered extremist crimes; informational coverage of the activities of the region's extremist communities and associations, including the structure of information resources covering the ideology and activity of the region's extremist communities and associations.

The authors made extensive use of the survey to assess the psychological aspects of the above-mentioned indicators. What follows is a more detailed discussion of the indicator for evaluating the protection of one's psyche is from the effects of informational factors that obstruct or complicate the formation of a normal information-oriented basis for the individual's social behavior. Analysis of two benchmarks (the level of existing extremist paradigms and presence of extremist elements in the minds of young people) produced the following results. The respondents were divided into two groups by gender and six groups by age (16 to 21 years old). Young men were more willing than girls to disclose their religious affiliation (a Jew, a Christian, an atheist, a Satanist). The respondents were asked to express their views on the following: Negative attitudes towards Jews; Positive attitudes towards Satan and Satanism; Negative attitudes towards people from the Caucasus and Central Asia; Glorification of Hitler and of other Nazi leaders; Negative attitudes towards the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC); Positive attitudes towards Jesus Christ and Christianity; Positive attitudes towards motherhood; Negative attitudes towards Islam; Use of Nazi symbols and greetings; and Nationalism. Each item was to be assessed on a four-point scale (unacceptable, rather unacceptable, rather acceptable and acceptable). The respondents ignored the last option, therefore, the affirmative response also sounds as 'rather acceptable'.

In our view, the respondent's denial/rejection of any extremist manifestation is credible only if he or she says this manifestation is unacceptable. If the respondent prefers saying it is rather unacceptable, it can be regarded as if he or she were willing to hide his true attitude to a particular phenomenon instead of saying it is rather acceptable, owing to a number of circumstances or out of fear of the consequences. When interpreting the results, however, the authors relied more on the 'rather acceptable' response option and regarded the 'rather unacceptable' responses as being representative of the respondents' ill-considered and unstable attitude. The results of the survey show that the statements for each position by some respondents are rather acceptable, including the following: Negative attitudes towards Jews (56% unacceptable, 32% rather unacceptable, 12% rather acceptable); Negative attitudes towards people from the Caucasus and Central Asia (47% unacceptable, 41% rather unacceptable and 12% rather acceptable); negative attitudes towards the ROC (57% unacceptable, 29% rather unacceptable, 14% rather acceptable); negative attitudes towards Islam (54% unacceptable, 34% rather

unacceptable and 12% rather acceptable), positive attitudes towards Satan and Satanism (58% unacceptable, 29% rather unacceptable and 13% rather acceptable); Glorification of Hitler and of other Nazi leaders (56% unacceptable, 35% rather unacceptable and 9% rather acceptable); Use of Nazi symbols and greetings (72% unacceptable, 23% rather unacceptable and 5% rather acceptable); and Nationalism (60% unacceptable, 28% rather unacceptable and 12% rather acceptable). The ratio between unacceptability of positive attitudes towards Jesus Christ and Christianity also deserves attention: (40% unacceptable, 16% rather unacceptable and 44% rather acceptable), and rather acceptable attitude towards the national religion (35% unacceptable, 24% rather unacceptable and 41% rather acceptable), although this is not statistically proved, since the correlation coefficient reflecting the mutual influence of the indicators is 0.2, which shows a very low relationship. Negative attitudes towards Christianity are correlated with positive attitudes about Satanism (the correlation coefficient is 0.65). This shows that the respondents positively perceiving Satan and Satanism, consider positive attitudes towards Christianity unacceptable. The average number of respondents supporting extremist ideas was 17%.

In gender terms, the average percentage of respondents supporting extremist ideas was 15% and 20% in the male and female groups respectively, which is indicative of increased radicalism among girls. In particular, women provided positive answers for the following positions: "negative attitudes towards Jews" (20%), "positive attitudes towards Satan and Satanism" (20%) and "negative attitudes towards Caucasians and Middle Asia" (20%). This also indicates the maturity of such views and, therefore, the strong influence of these extremist ideas on the individual, given that they are shared by a relatively large percentage of respondents. The percentage of acceptance is lower in the following positions: "negative attitudes towards the ROC" (14%), "negative attitudes towards Islam" (13%) and "nationalism" (10%). The male respondents were more radical than the female ones: "negative attitudes towards the ROC" (15%), "nationalism" (13%), "negative attitude towards Islam" (11%).

The authors also conducted surveys in a number of educational institutions and among people of different age groups (students and schoolchildren). The data showed that the average percentage of extremist-minded respondents in universities and colleges is higher than that of high school students in general education schools (20-22% in universities and colleges against 13% in high schools). Moreover, more destructive ideas were positively evaluated by respondents enrolled in universities than in high schools. It is therefore possible to speak of a strong conceptual presence of extremism-related ideas among students. Extremist ideas are generally chaotic and unsystematic among the schoolchildren, whereas they transform into a system of views among some university and college students. Besides, extremist views are of different nature depending on the respondents' age: they are mostly confessional in nature among schoolchildren and ethnic or nationalist among college students. In short, high schools are in a better situation than universities and colleges in terms of the level and content of extremist manifestations.

The survey also provides insights for the following benchmark of the first psychological indicator, namely the number of young people with inadequate (extremist) behavior, because, sooner or later, views and attitudes begin to show externally transforming from verbal battles to physical violence. A total of 1,425 schoolchildren and 1,575 students were interviewed. An average quantitative ratio of respondents supporting extremist ideas is as follows: approximately 225 people in high school and 330 people in universities and colleges. In view of the above, the degree of protection of the

youth's psyche from the effects of informational factors obstructing or complicating the formation of an adequate information-oriented basis for the individual's social behavior is satisfactory in Kemerovo Oblast. The percentage of respondents who support extremism is not dramatic.

The benchmark used to investigate the second indicator (resistance to destructive external and internal influences) was the "number of young people exposed to extremist influences through mind control and promotion of antihuman values". In part, this benchmark can also be examined using the results of the survey. Since the Internet and other social networks are easily accessible and young people (students and schoolchildren) are their active users, most extremist ideas reach their minds via these means of communications. Young people show great interest in viewing and "liking" the so-called "top" videos. It is assumed that if one shows interest in the popular content, one is in the top. For some time now, and not without the active participation of various extremist organizations, most of this extremist content is believed top-notch and attractive for young people who are highly susceptible to brainwashing and indoctrination. In this regard, the indicator under discussion (resistance to destructive external and internal influences) can also be evaluated by the average percentage of extremism-oriented respondents (20-22% in colleges and universities against 13-19% in high schools). Some researchers suggest that this percentage does not call for drastic measures, yet it is sufficiently alarming for our tolerant society (Krivtsova, 2015, pp. 155-160.) The data suggests that schoolchildren who communicate more with their parents and teachers are better protected from destructive external influences, and, therefore, have greater resistance to destructive external and internal influences as compared to college and university students.

Our investigation of the first indicator of the informational aspect (the degree of information security ensuring vitally important interests) drew upon data obtained from a regional extremism monitoring campaign conducted between April-May 2015 and March-April 2016 under the direction of Schiller. Special attention was given to historical facts, information about historical personalities and general views on history due to the fact that a rootless person who knows nothing of the history of his country is morally and politically disoriented, becoming highly susceptible to destructive information, which cannot but affect his mental condition and life in general. This may result in the improper behavior of a person or a group, distorted moral criteria and standards and psycho-emotional and socio-psychological tensions. An eloquent example of this are troubling events of recent years taking place in Ukraine.

Our monitoring research is based on the content of virtual social networks and on interactions with extremist groups active in virtual space. The benchmark used to evaluate the above-mentioned indicator were "distorted historical facts, dissemination of knowingly false information obstructing the individual's normal formation and development". The data obtained shows that neo-Nazis often use the poorly controlled Internet space and virtual social network venues to spread pseudo-historical myths aimed at creating a positive image of Hitler, his associates and their domestic and foreign policies that are often associated with economic and social stability, fight against unemployment, effective national policies, large-scale construction of infrastructure facilities, among others. Besides the glorification of Hitler and other Nazi leaders, the authors also notes the presence of a number of pseudo-religious and pseudo-historical myths about the world and Slavic-Russian history, in which the swastika does not symbolize the Third Reich but acts as an ancient solar sign common among the Indo-

European and, in particular, the Eastern Slavs. A similar interpretation is put on the Nazi salute performed by lifting the right arm into the air with a straightened palm facing down. This gesture is perceived as a pagan greeting of the sun, "from the heart to the sun." In their turn, Russian neo-Pagans argue that ancient Slavic plowmen greeted the sun with the from-the-heart-to-the-sun gesture before the planting season and decorated their tools, clothes, utensils and homes with swastikas.

At the same time, Schiller and Volkhina maintain that Russian young people generally perceive Nazi symbolism as a tool to confront Islam and to fight "alien dominance" (40, pp. 41-52). The effects of this knowingly false information on the youth are manifest in the extremism monitoring results. During the three surveys in April-May 2015, September-October 2015 and March-April 2016, Schiller and his colleagues recorded a steady growth of the following indicators: "glorification of Hitler and other Nazi leaders" (from 9% to 11%), "use of Nazi symbols and greetings" (from 5% to 14%) and "negative attitudes towards Islam" (from 12% to 19%). In Schiller's opinion, "Acting as a repository of extremist materials and a major means for spreading extremist ideas, the Internet forms a combination of ideas and ideological outlooks, explains in a straightforward manner the complex and contradictory processes occurring in the society and, thus, produces certain stereotypes. In particular, defamation of the existing scientific and historical knowledge is done through the system of demotivators (40, pp. 43-44), resulting in the promotion of pseudo-historical ideas in the form of audio-visual and textual content. These ideas serve as the basis for initiating administrative and criminal prosecution under articles 20.3 and 20.29 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation and under articles 280, 282, 282.1-3 and 354.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In its turn, this serves as an eloquent example of the threat known as mind control, illustrated by popular demotivational pictures distributed through VKontakte, a Russian social network, by senior high school students and students attending professional educational institutions. This is one of manipulative techniques or mechanisms for implementing this threat. In one of such pictures, a student asks his History teacher "Do you want me to answer according to the textbook, or shall I tell you what really happened?" (Fig. 2). Another poster shows the American president and a person from the Caucasus area making the following statements scribbled here and there across the poster: *Russian cattle must not know their real history!, Cattle, believe this: you are boozers, descendants of slaves, Russians are not a nation, you are backward and copy the West!, You are ignoble and dishonest! Russia is only 1,000 years old!, Ukrainians, Belarussians and Russians are different peoples!, Information war. They told you a pack of blatant lies even at school* (Fig. 1).

When looking at these images, even historically unsophisticated people may have an impression that the official history taught at school is part of the information war carried out by the authorities in order to mislead the population and abounding in myths that do not reflect the historical realities. As for the "real" historical knowledge, it is thought to exist on the Internet, which is free from censorship and political motivation. Such ideas flow into the minds of young people who do not have the slightest idea about historical research or scholarly reconstructions and interpretations of the data obtained. Those who distribute such pictures are amateurs who have no idea that no professional historian can provide a universal answer to the question "What really happened?" These pictures, however count over a thousand of "reposts" and "likes," which points to their significant impact on young minds.

Dissemination of such misinformation, defamation and presentation of historical facts as false is unacceptable and suppressed in every possible way by the official media (television, radio, print) and, consequently, its major means of promotion is the Internet that falls outside the jurisdiction of the Media law. In this context, the degree of information security ensuring the individual's vital interests is evaluated as average and rather satisfactory. It should be, however, taken into consideration that, in terms of information, young people usually give priority to the Internet, which points to the need to both work with the youth and clean up the Internet content. The next indicator to be discussed is the degree of protection against destructive information inciting to extremism and terrorism and the benchmark for assessing it can be defined as information-based pressure aimed at changing one's worldviews, political views moral and mental condition. Demotivational anti-Semitic pictures can serve as an example of such information pressure. These pictures, drawn from Shiller's monitoring materials (2016), are highly popular in Vkontakte among high school students and students attending specialized secondary schools who post them on their personal pages, in thematic public or neo-Nazi groups.

The first plot presents a collective image of the Jews aimed at stirring up hostility and hatred towards Jews. This picture shows a Russian hero with an axe leaning against a logo with coats of arms of the Russian Federation and holding a bottle that contains an ugly man with hypertrophied facial features, stereotypically perceived as features peculiar to the Jews. Above and below the image runs the following inscription: *Look, Vasya, what scum proliferates in Russia again* (Fig. 3). The second plot presents two photographs showing a handsome Slavic boy and an ugly Jewish boy and the inscription below says: *Better than a thousand of words* (Fig. 4). According to the creators, these are the generalized images of the Slavic and Jewish peoples aimed at creating a distorted stereotypical perception of these ethnic groups, which falls under Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (40, p. 45).

The objective of both plots is to foment inter-ethnic discord and aggression towards Jews, and the fact that they have over a thousand of "likes" points to their approval by the youth and to the extent of this threat's influence (mind control and promotion of antihuman values) upon the youth. The present state of affairs is due to frequent access to specific Internet resources, which perpetuates these destructive trends among the Russian youth. According to the monitoring data collected by Schiller, 88% of the surveyed high school and college students spend 6 to 8 hours every day visiting popular social networks. Demotivational pictures are not the only manipulative technique used by extremist organizations. Another popular technique is engagement into the so-called "social projects" (for example, Okkupai-Pedophilyai, Okkupai-Narcofilai, Okkupai-Alkofilyai, Restruct-Education, Restruct-Charity). The technique known as "those who are not with us are against us" is based on the fact that, for example, if one criticizes and applauds measures taken against pedophiles, he is considered a latent pedophile himself. Another technique is recruitment into extremist organizations: contact is established with the targeted person by agreeing with his views in online discussions or by commenting on his posts, audios and videos, after which he is provided with extremism-related print and audio-visual materials. Other techniques include the virus grapevine technique known as a flash mob (for example, Hardbass), the NORNA educational program developed by P. Khomyakov, a professor at the Moscow University or A. Mukhachev's network project entitled *The Great Game. Break the System* (39, pp. 57-65; 42, pp. 114-119).

In general, the indicator under investigation, i.e. the degree of protection against destructive information inciting to extremism and terrorism, can be assessed in the same way as the previous one (the degree of protection is average and rather satisfactory). This is due to the fact that most extremist information is spread through the Internet, while the official mass media, perceived as objective and truthful by the majority of older age groups, are protected from it. The authors evaluated yet another indicator (the degree of social security of the person in Kemerovo Oblast) by assessing the extent and effectiveness of security measures taken in the region. The following indicators were used to carry out the assessment:

1. Anti-extremist measures implemented by law enforcement agencies and other organizations in Kemerovo Oblast and their effectiveness. According to the State Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Kemerovo Oblast, investigative work is under way and dozens of criminal and administrative cases are being filed regarding the extremist content of posts in online social networks (40, pp. 45-46). As a result, extremist organizations and individuals are forced to remove all extremist information from their Internet pages and websites. Furthermore, a hotline (or helpline) telephone number is available on the official website of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for citizens to report any extremist actions (30). In addition, unofficial sources indicated that the Federal Security Service for Kemerovo Oblast is implementing a program, under which all public places and road intersections are to be equipped with cameras for the FSS to control the movement of suspected extremists. Finally, Russia's Department of Internal Affairs is involved in delivering public awareness lectures on extremism in schools with a view to counter extremism.

Other organizations are also involved in activities aimed at countering extremism. As an example, the Laboratory of Social and Political Studies (LSPI), affiliated with the Avgur Expert-Analytical Agency and headed by V. Shiller, PhD in Political Science and Associate Professor at the Kemerovo State University, focuses on monitoring extremist views and manifestations (44). To prevent extremism and to increase awareness of anti-extremist legislation and of Russian history among young people, the laboratory produces anti-extremist videos and distributes them through the ResPublica group in Vkontakte (45), accounts teachers and of public figures, the Kuzbass Police' VKontakte account (46), and on the laboratory's official YouTube channel (47) (34, pp. 75-79). Accessible to all youth age groups, these video clips dispel the myths through which the extremists manipulate young people's minds and, as such, are an effective way of preventing and fighting extremism. In addition to this type of extremism prevention in use in the region, the LSPI and its representatives are engaged in giving anti-extremist and anti-terrorist lectures in educational institutions, regional executive authorities, local self-governing bodies and local power structures, including the State Department of Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs for Kemerovo Oblast and the Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee for Kemerovo Oblast. The LSPI also hold theoretical and practical workshop, round tables, coordination committees, conferences and Skype forums to share experience with both Russian and international colleagues. An LSPI-based Pro et Contra Discussion Platform, established by Flyagin, Shapkina and Usoltsev (37, pp. 79-85), is also worth mentioning.

Furthermore, representatives of the Kuzbass Metropolitanate and the Spiritual Board of Muslims in Kemerovo Oblast actively participate in the effort to explain to the

public the values professed by traditional religions as part of work on extremism prevention (22, pp. 69-72).

The Kuzbass Regional Institute for the Development of Professional Education is another bulwark against extremism, particularly in Kemerovo Oblast's professional education system. This institution provides academic and methodological services to local professional institutions with a view to counteract extremism. Specifically, upon instructions from the Department of Education and Science of Kemerovo Oblast, this institute developed a set of informational and educational materials related to this issue and a working program for the *Combating Terrorist Ideologies in the Russian Federation* module, which is included in all advanced training courses offered at the Kuzbass Regional Institute. In this regard, Kemerovo Oblast's educational institutions organize thematic classes, lectures, talks and roundtables on extremism and terrorism for students and their parents. Most educational institutions monitor tolerance and interethnic relations and give close attention to visual materials' design, anti-extremism and anti-terrorism information stands and counter extremism booklets. Information on ongoing anti-terrorism measures and activities aimed at countering extremism ideologies is also available on the official websites of the discussed institutions. Various commemoration events, such as rallies and in memory of victims of terrorist attacks, film sessions and days of solidarity with the struggle against terrorism). Young people are also encouraged to take part in city and regional events, volunteer work and ethnic cultural festivals. To get young people involved in these activities, educational organizations are active in engaging officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecutor's Office and Russia's Federal Security Service. Considering that, in the age of informational technologies, extremist and other ideologies are distributed mainly through the Internet, some institutions have formed student "cyber-crews" to fight "cyber-terrorism". Their activities, including public awareness campaigns, are carried out in cooperation with the local law enforcement agencies.

In April-May 2017, the Kuzbass Regional Institute conducted a sociological survey on the civic-mindedness of Kuzbass students, revealing that most students respect the rules of tolerance. Only 7% of the respondents said to be ready, as a last resort, for illegitimate actions in fighting representatives of other nationalities, religions, political views in the extreme cases, and 19% said to be ready to implement all possible legal methods. These results also illustrate the effectiveness of preventive work in the region. The survey involved 1015 students attending ten professional training organizations and one higher education institution in Kemerovo Oblast (22, pp. 69-72). Clearly, large-scale effective anti-extremism work is under way in Kemerovo Oblast, as evidenced by the results of other benchmarks of the indicator under investigation.

2. The number of extremist organizations in Kemerovo Oblast or of extremist organizations involving the region's residents. What follows is a list of extremist organizations and individuals operating in Kemerovo and Kemerovo Oblast: Restrukt; Resistance All-Russian Extreme Right Movement in Kemerovo; National Democratic Party (NDP); SS Vzglyad (Outlook); Northern Brotherhood Interregional Public Association (non-profit organization); Russia's Jehovah's Witnesses Administrative Center (religious organization) (33); Krishna's Consciousness Society (in Kemerovo and Novokuznetsk); Kuzbass Slavic World Public Organization (32); Movement Against Illegal Immigration (non-profit interregional public organization) (35); Jundullah Islamic Group (29); Islamic State (Al-Qaeda?); National Socialist Society (international public association); Spiritual

and Patrimonial Russian Power (interregional public organization); FORMAT-18 (interregional public association) and Muvahhid Jamaat Group (35) (See Annex 1). Thus, according to the studied benchmark (the number of extremist organizations in Kemerovo Oblast or of extremist organizations involving the region's residents), a total of 15 organizations have been recorded in the past two decades. In 2016-2017, only seven of them continued to have adepts, which also indicates a relatively high level of social security of the person in the region and illustrates the effectiveness of measures taken by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Service in the region.

3. The number of registered extremist crimes. According to the Legal Statistics Portal, less than 17.40 crimes were registered in Kemerovo Oblast between January and December 2017, whereas the total number of crimes registered in Russia was 1521. The Portal's online version also provides evidence of decreased crime rate compared to 2016 (less than 30 committed crimes). Additionally, 106.2 terrorist crimes were committed in Kemerovo Oblast between January and December 2017 against 1871 terrorist crimes across Russia and less than 51.4 criminals were identified in Kemerovo Oblast between January and February 2017 against 873 identified criminals across Russia (26) These data are relative, as the website indicated only the quantitative range. According to the described benchmarks, Kemerovo Oblast has one of Russia's lowest crime rates. Given the relatively low quantitative crime data for Kemerovo Oblast, the discussed benchmark points to the relatively high anti-terrorism effectiveness in the region to the relatively low level of interest among extremist organizations in the region. The results of Schiller's extremism monitoring campaign conducted in 2015 and 2016 showed positive dynamics in extremist attitudes among Kuzbass students, including anti-Islamism, popularity of Hitler and his associates, Nazi symbols. According to Schiller, this positive trend is mainly due to the effective informational structure and online content (40, pp. 45-46). In this regard, no anti-extremist measure taken by law enforcement and other agencies will be fully effective until the Internet is taken under control and protective mechanisms are formed in order to prevent extremist ideas from penetrating the young minds.

4. Informational coverage of the activities of the region's extremist communities and associations. According to Schiller's monitoring, such activities are currently covered mainly by the Internet. Vkontakte is the increasingly popular Russian social network which is most commonly used for this purpose and which contains most of the extremist content. The second and third major Russian social networks are Odnoklassniki and Facebook respectively (39, p. 58). Also, the authors used the Federal List of Extremist Materials available on the official website of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation to identify the structure of informational resources related to the ideologies and activities of the region's extremist communities and associations (35). It is important to point out in advance that the Federal List of Extremist Materials for Kemerovo Oblast provides data only from 2002 to 2016, whereas, for the other regions, the information is provided for 2017-2018 as well. As for the situation in Kemerovo for 2017 and 2018, two assumptions can be addressed in this context. Anti-extremist measures may have become significantly better since 2017, resulting in the Internet's protection from certain materials. Alternatively, judicial proceedings for years 2017 and 2018 have not yet been completed and decisions are yet to be made, given that the Federal List contains only the materials are adjudicated as extremist. In general, the authors presented the data on the structure of extremism-related informational materials in Kemerovo Oblast in a number of tables.

Resource	2013	2014	2015	2016
Internet	3	30	7	38
Unknown source	13	1	1	0

Table 1. Extremism-related informational resources (Kemerovo Oblast)

Based on the table above, the Internet is the major informational resource for disseminating extremist materials. Other resources such as newspapers, printed publications, brochures, leaflets were nonetheless widespread until 2013. It is hard to be more precise, as the Federal List contains no specific data on resources other than the Internet before 2013. However, extremist materials such as videos, audios, texts and songs with no specified sources are listed for 2013 and in later years. Supposedly, videos could have been taken from television materials, songs and audio recordings from radio broadcasts and texts from newspapers and other publications. Seven extremist videos (possibly from television) and six audio recordings (possibly from a radio broadcast.) were detected in 2013. One text (possibly from a newspaper) and one song (possibly from a radio broadcast) were detected in 2014 and 2015, respectively.

Type of extremist material	2013	2014	2015	2016
Video materials	7	7	4	-
Video phonogram	-	8	-	-
Video commercial	-	1	-	-
Audio recording (audio file)	6	9	-	11
Song	-	-	4	-
Phonogram	-	2	-	-
Text (informational material)	1	2	-	3
Article	1	-	-	-
Illustrated booklet	1	-	-	-
Graphic imagee	-	2	-	3
Graphic image with text	-	-	-	11
Photograph with text	-	-	-	6
Repost	-	-	-	1
Screenshot of graphic image with text	-	-	-	3

Table 2. Types of extremism-related materials (by year).

Based on the table above, audio recordings or audio files are the most common extremist materials, whereas video materials (present until 2016) and graphic images with text (being as popular as audio recordings in 2016) are ranked second and third respectively. These materials must be monitored and withheld from public view in the first place. Monitoring of extremist materials also showed that technical progress affected this area as well and new types of extremist materials have appeared since 2016, including graphic images with text, photographs with text, reposts and screenshots of graphic images with text. In general, outbursts of extremist materials occurred in 2014 (30 items) and in 2016 (38 items). However, compared to big cities like Moscow or St. Petersburg and to other regions, these quantitative data show extremist activities being rather unpopular in Kemerovo Oblast, which is also due to the effective operational work of the Department of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Service.

City/Town	2013	2014	2015	2016
Kemerovo	11	22	3	32
Belovo	-	2	-	-
Novokuznetsk	1	-	4	-
Guryevsk	-	-	-	6
Myski	3	-	-	-
Topki	-	2	-	-
Mezhdurechensk	-	-	1	-
Yashkino	-	3	-	-
Tashtagol	1	-	-	-
Prokopievsk	-	2	-	-

Table 3. Representation of extremist materials in the cities and towns of Kemerovo Oblast (by year).

Table 3 shows that the city of Kemerovo is leads in the number of extremist materials produced on its territory owing to the presence of a regional center and of major facilities that could be of interest to extremists and terrorists. Guriyevsk follows far behind, with relevant data available as late as 2016) and Novokuznetsk ranks third, with relevant data recorded in 2013 and 2015 only.

Type of extremist content	2013	2014	2015	2016
1.Nationalism (glorification of Hitler and his activity)	11	16	4	8
2.Against the Caucasians	-	8	-	20
3.Against the Jews	1	1	1	5
4.Against Americans	-	1	-	-
5.Against African Americans	-	1	-	2
6.Native Religion	-	1	-	1
7.Radical Islam (call to terrorism)	1	3	3	-
8.Undefined orientation	2	-	-	4

Table 4. Thematic orientation of extremist materials.

Table 4 shows that nationalist views appear to be the strongest in Kemerovo Oblast (glorification of Hitler and his activity), whereas negative attitudes towards the Caucasians and Central Asians took the leading position in 2016, Antisemitism ranking third. It follows that counter extremism measures should focus mainly on these areas.

## Discussion

In the course of this research, the authors formulated the most comprehensive typology of the components of social security of the person, with a focus on its psychological and informational aspects owing to their primary role in the information society presenting challenges and threats related to transmission of information and its influence on the individual. To conclude these observations, the system of indicators and their benchmarks developed by the authors to examine the psychological and informational aspects of social security of the person was tested successfully. Our assumption about the influence of existing threats and about the effectiveness of counteracting measures in terms of social security of the person in the region proved to be correct.

Among the revealed threats social security of the person are the following: mind control (through indoctrination of false ideas and values, misinformation, defamation and presentation of false facts about Russian history), promotion of antihuman values,

incitement to extremism, creation of extremist organizations and propagation of their ideas. Research usually classifies these threats potential. Their main source (or resource) are various social networking websites. These threats come from activities done by individuals and entities as well as public organizations. The system of indicators for the level social security of the person in the region reveals the degree of these threats' impact, measured by the stage of their development, among others. For example, the discussion of the psychological aspect of the first indicator (i.e. protection of the human psyche from the effects of informational factors obstructing or complicating the formation of an adequate information-oriented basis for the individual's social behavior) led to the following conclusion. In terms of organization, certain extremist subject matters were assessed as developed by a number of respondents, which is illustrative of extremists' skill in controlling people's minds and promoting antihuman values. These subject matters are as follows: negative attitude towards Jews, positive attitude to Satan and Satanism, negative attitude towards Caucasians and Central Asians, negative attitude towards the Russian Orthodox Church, nationalism, negative attitude towards Islam. However, popularity of extremist ideas among students residing in Kemerovo Oblast region is not significant (15% in the male group, 20% in the female group), although it has high growth potential. Interestingly, college and university students are more susceptible to extremist ideas than high school students, whose ideas about extremist are generally chaotic and non-systematic, whereas college and university students have developed them into a frame of mind. The obtained results are mainly due to effective preventive work carried out in educational institutions, which is not, however, compulsory in higher educational institutions focused on providing educational services only. These results can also be explained by the age-related specificities of the respondents' psyche, schoolchildren being more receptive to the information presented to them by their parents and teachers, and by the importance of family life, from which out-of-town students are usually detached.

In our view, the high percentage of intolerant respondents among students may be due to a feeling of discomfort or threat in the presence of representatives of other nationalities, such as Jews or Caucasians, perceived as potential contenders for their future jobs or potential radical Islamists; manifestations of racism may even originate in these students' families [13, pp. 196-207]. In turn, the alarming percentage of extremist female respondents' points to certain destructive factors in the society that deforms the traditionally more tolerant and conservative female minds. Further research is required to investigate such factors. The results obtained for the next indicator (i.e. the number of young people with extremist behavior) can be derived from the survey, given that the obtained views and attitudes will, sooner or later, be expressed externally as verbal battles and physical violence and represent some 16% and 20% of the surveyed schoolchildren and college/university students respectively. These numbers are not significant, since nothing usually goes beyond verbal expression; however, verbal aggression can transform into physical violence in certain adverse circumstances. Preventing them is, therefore, of utmost importance.

In view of the above, the degree of protection of the youths' psyche from the effects of informational factors obstructing or complicating the formation of an adequate information-oriented basis for the individual's social behavior is satisfactory. The percentage of respondents supporting extremist ideas is not dramatic. Closer attention, however, should be paid to preventive work with students in order to increase their psychological resilience to destructive information. The next indicator - resistance to

destructive external and internal influences – was evaluated according to the following benchmark: the number of youth subject to extremist influences and mind control (promotion of antihuman values). Directly related to the previous one (the number of young people with extremist behavior), this indicator was measured by taking into consideration the average percentage of extremist respondents (20-22% in colleges and universities and 13-19% in secondary schools). The results obtained allowed the authors to assess young people's resistance to destructive influences as satisfactory and requiring no cardinal measures but disturbing enough for the tolerance-focused society. Schoolchildren show greater resistance than college and university students due to the same reasons as in the previous indicator. In our view, most preventive work should concentrate the indicator being investigated, due to its fundamental importance.

The benchmark entitled “distorted historical facts, dissemination of knowingly false information obstructing the individual's normal formation and development” was used in our study of the first indicator's informational aspect, i.e. the level of information security providing vitally important interests. To do this, the authors considered historical facts, facts about historical personalities and views on history as such, the knowledge of which increases the individual's resistance to destructive information. Our research findings pointed to a large number of pseudo-historical and pseudo-religious information available online, which discredits existing scientific and historical knowledge by means of demotivational posters. This is one of manipulative techniques used by extremists and extremist organizations to influence the consciousness of an individual for recruiting purposes. Given that the official media suppresses in every possible way misinformation, defamation and presentation of false facts about Russian history and that the Internet is the major means for promoting such information, it can be concluded that the degree of information security ensuring the individual's vital interests in the region is average and quite satisfactory. However, in terms of informational education, the youth as an age group often gives priority to the Internet, where the degree of information security is rather low, hence the need for more intense preventive work with the youth and for stricter control of the Internet content.

The second indicator (i.e. the degree of protection from destructive information inciting to extremism and terrorism), based on the factor titled “targeted pressure aimed at changing one's worldview, political views, moral and psychological conditions” also shows an average and rather satisfactory degree of protection. This indicator, however, has high growth potential, provided that the youth consider virtual space as a full-fledged substitute for the official mass media perceived as containing distorted information on events in order to please the authorities and lacking the possibilities offered by the virtual world. Consequently, the more destructive information is disseminated on the Internet, the more people will have access to it and visit these sites and the lower the degree of protection from this destructive information will be. Information-related indicators are highly unstable and external factor can greatly affect them. Both indicators reveal threats such as mind control, promotion of antihuman values and incitement to extremism. The study of the psychological indicators showed that the impact of such threats on the individual, especially on young people, is not dramatic but alarming, particularly with regard to extremism-inclined young people.

To make the present research study as complete as possible, the author also investigated another indicator (i.e. the degree of social security of the person in Kemerovo Oblast), which pointed to a threat consisting in the creation of extremist organizations and the propagation of their ideas. In terms of the effectiveness of counter-extremism

measures taken by law enforcement agencies and other organizations in Kemerovo Oblast, it can be concluded that a large-scale counter-extremism work is under way in Kemerovo Oblast, whose effectiveness is manifest in the benchmarks of the indicator under discussion. The number of extremist organizations in Kemerovo Oblast or of extremist organizations involving the region's residents for 2016-2017 is extremely low (7 organizations total). The number of registered extremist crimes in 2017 is also extremely low (less than 17.4), which is indicative of a relatively good situation in the region. For the past few years, informational coverage of the activities of the region's extremist communities and associations has been implemented via the Internet only (the identification of the source of threat/online resource), the most popular social network being Vkontakte. Audio files are the preferred type of extremist materials, followed by video materials (until 2016); graphic images, which in 2016 were as popular as audio files, rank third. With continuing advanced in technology, however, new kinds of extremist materials emerge such as photographs with text, reposts, screenshots of graphic images with text.

One of Russia's regional centers, Kemerovo leads in the number of extremist materials being created on its territory. Based on their content, preventive work with people residing in Kemerovo Oblast should focus on the following areas: nationalism (glorification of Hitler and his activity), negative attitudes towards Caucasians and Central Asians (this benchmark ranked first in 2016) and antisemitism. All of these areas have a major impact on the population. In general, the study demonstrated the high degree of effectiveness of anti-extremist measures taken in Kemerovo Oblast and low interest in this region on the part of extremist/terrorist organizations. In view of the above, the level of social security of the person in Kemerovo Oblast in the region can be defined as relatively high.

## Conclusion

The level of social security of the person in Kemerovo Oblast is relatively satisfactory from both psychological and informational aspects. The degree of these threats' impact on the individual, albeit insignificant, has certain potential for growth. Social security of the person in the region is ensured rather only in terms of control and restraint of extremist tendencies and manifestations rather than their prevention. This creates a need for more drastic measures for educating the population, including the youth, which must direct at developing protective mechanisms in the human mind.

Possible recommendations include the following:

1. Regularly assess the level of social security of the person throughout Russian regions.
2. Further explore personal and psychological characteristics of people susceptible to manipulative techniques that are popular among extremists (i.e. in what states the individual is most susceptible to outside influences). Remember that there are two groups of individuals susceptible to extremist ideologies. The first group includes people who have an inherent predisposition towards radical ideologies such as aggressive, maximalist, narcissistic, intolerant or defiant people who recognize no authority, law or social norms. The second group consists of people in unfavorable circumstances resulting in weakened protective mechanisms of one's psyche, including lonely individuals in desperate need for belonging to a group, outcasts, individuals in search of a mentor or a

*raison d'être*, infantile individuals having psychological problems, depressed individuals, those experiencing a spiritual crisis or with poor critical thinking skills.

3. Engage in awareness-raising educational activities explaining the objectives, methods and means of modern mind control techniques, in particular, to college and university students and to foster tolerance in society towards representatives of other ethnic groups such as Caucasians and Jews
4. Keep in touch with and create awareness of the importance of family among parents (especially parents of out-of-town students).
5. Actively engage audio and visual means of communication in order to counter extremism by creating relevant videos or by inviting creative professionals to produce attractive instructive songs and films to be broadcast on the Internet and in all media.
6. Develop behaviorally safe personalities by improving their protective mechanisms to all destructive influences, while focusing on the individual's development and self-development. Work out methods and techniques aimed at increasing the individual's susceptibility to various threats of a different nature. These include teaching the individual to control his dependence on external influences; forming the need to analyze his personal, spiritual and psychological environment; training the individual to foresee danger and to be aware of external negative influences in an attempt to improve the individual's ability to resist internal and external destructive influences. Specifically, attention should be given to training the individual to apply the following skills in everyday life: recognize a dangerous situation by specific signs; determine its nature, area of actions and possible effects; develop a plan of action to avoid danger, in other words, take relevant measures for minimizing eventual damage; eliminate negative effects of danger (25, p. 28). Furthermore, measures are to be taken to ensure that the individual's mental state remains normal. In this regard, the individual should be trained to master self-regulation methods (10, pp. 450-462), develop his mental and physical qualities as well as his resiliency in extreme situations, among others. Attention should also be given to the development of the following adaptation techniques: a sense of purpose, responsibility for meaningful events in one's life, short- and long-term life plans and personal psychological maturity. Overall, self-reliance methods are the main major methods for ensuring security of the person and need to be implemented in order to increase personal integration and to develop self-consciousness, personal potential and other individual qualities.
7. Restrict access to the Internet for individuals from risk groups, for example, by prohibiting extremism-related posts in V Kontakte by means of a system for recognizing relevant keywords. Actively monitor the Internet in search of extremist posts, include them in the Federal List of Extremist Materials and, subsequently, remove them from the network or block them to lower attendance rates.

The above recommendations will increase the effectiveness of preventive work and create a rational, safe and caring society capable of imposing preventive measures in order to maintain social security instead of fighting the adverse impacts of these threats.

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## Annex 1

1. Restrukt. Regional leaders: Timofey Gromov, Nikolay Osipov and Nikolay Sulzhin. Between mid-July 2013 and May 2015, the Vkontakte account of the Okkupai-Pedofiliai Kemerovo Group had 750 subscribers, mostly represented by 13- to 15-year old high school students as well as students attending secondary educational institutions. Numerous criminal proceedings were initiated between May and September 2015 and many Restrukt members were arrested, mainly for extortion and robbery. The town of Mezhdurechensk also had an office of the Restrukt Group, renamed Rat Svaroga (Svarog's Army) in Vkontakte (<https://vk.com/ratisvaroga>) following the group's closure. As of 2016, the group had 68 members. As of February 2017, it has 62 members.

2. Resistance All-Russian Extreme Right Movement in Kemerovo. Exists since 2008; in Kuzbass since 2011. The movement's regional leader Roman Zentsov defines its ideology as socialist, anarchist and nationalist. Criminal proceedings were held in summer 2015 and punishment was imposed on the group's nationalist members and skinheads. As of now, the group's Vkontakte account remains active (<https://vk.com/soprotivlenie42>) and continues its activities, but the extremist content has disappeared almost altogether. As of February 2017, the group had 57 members, compared to 62 members in 2016. The group's another Vkontakte account is the all-Russian Soprotivleniye (Resistance) ([https://vk.com/soprotivlenie\\_ws](https://vk.com/soprotivlenie_ws)) with 63 058 registered members.

3. National Democratic Party (NDP). Exists since March 2012. Has a Kemerovo branch. The core of the party consists of two nationalist organizations, the Russian Public Movement (since 2004) and the Russian Civil Union (since 2010). The NDP's leader in Kemerovo is Nikolay Fedorov. Regional leaders and co-organizers were detained in September 2012 following the March of the Millions and imprisoned for a short period. The NDP, along with its 50 branches throughout Russia, is still active in Kemerovo, because it is not a radical organization and respects the laws of the Russian Federation.

4. SS Vzglyad (Outlook) ([https://vk.com/vzglyad\\_ss](https://vk.com/vzglyad_ss)). Vzglyad is a nationalist community that has been active in Vkontakte since January 2016. As of now, it is blocked for insults to the personality (19, pp. 74-79).

5. Northern Brotherhood Interregional Public Association (non-profit organization). Established in January 2007 and banned by the order of the Moscow City Court on August 6 2012. One of the organization's symbols is the so-called Svarog Square. Leaders: Petr Khomyakov, Anton Mukhachev. The organization's ideology is presented in the NORNA programs, short for the national liberation of the Russian people (in Russian). Svarog

Squares first appeared in the city of Kemerovo in early November 2015, notably in Central District's public places, including building walls, garbage cans and power shields (39, pp. 57-65).

6. Russia's Jehovah's Witnesses Administrative Center (religious organization). The total number of adepts in Russia is approximately 200,000. Eleven branches are located in the following cities and town of Kemerovo Oblast: Berezovsky, Prokopyevsk, Novokuznetsk, Osinniki, Kaltan, Myski, Kemerovo (Central), Belovo (Central), Kiselevsk, Anzhero-Sudzhensk and Tashtagol. This organization was included in the list of extremist organizations by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in April 20 2017 (by the appellate ruling of the Appeal Board of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 17 July 2017) according to Part 4 of Article 9 of the Federal Law No. 114-FZ On Combating Extremist Activities dated 25.07.2002 (33).

7. Krishna's Consciousness Society (in Kemerovo and Novokuznetsk). Its members are nationalists and anti-patriots professing the totalitarian East-inspired cult.

8. Kuzbass Slavic World Public Organization. Closed by the decision of the Kemerovo Regional Court of 27 November 2001 under article 43 of the Federal Law on Public Associations (no correction of the violations in the timeframes set by the law). The authors, however, do not know what violations the organization committed and whether they were related to real xenophobic activities or to any formal shortcomings in the organization's activities). The decision to close this organization was made before the adoption of the Law on Combating Extremist Activities in 2002. This organization was included in the list of extremist and terrorist organizations compiled by Russia's Federal Financial Monitoring Service (32) after the entry into force of this law.

9. Movement Against Illegal Immigration (non-profit interregional public organization). This organization was recognized as extremist by the decision of the Moscow Regional Court of 18 April 2011 and by the ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 9 August 2011. According to the Federal List of Extremist Materials, the following extremist audio recordings made in the town of Myski in 2013 point to this organization's influence on the residents of Kemerovo Oblast: Buchenwald Flava, Kill Immigrant Lenin's Package; KREK 01. Eternal Paradise and Iron Order 88 (by the decision of Kemerovo Oblast's Myskov City Court dated 23 September 2013) (35).

10. Jundullah Islamic Group (Warriors of Allah in Arabic). Jundullah is an Islamist terror group in Iran, also known as the Movement of People's Resistance of Iran, established in 2003 and active in both Iran and Pakistan's Balochistan. Jundullah brings together the insurgent Balochi Sunnis, while most Iranians are Shiites. A number of experts suspect the organization of contacts with the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. In 2010, the US State Department included the Jundullah Islamic Group in the list of foreign terrorist organizations. Iran's Security Service arrested Jundullah's leader Abdolmalek Rigi on 23 February 2010 (29). The following audio and video files were found on Mansur Musayev's Vkontakte account in the city of Kemerovo in 2014: Appeal of Syrian Mujahids shortly before the attack on Minnah Airport (video), Upon leaving our homes we left to fight and Jundullah is my first fight (audio recordings by Jundullah Studio). These materials were prohibited by the decision of Kemerovo's Central District Court on 9 September 2014 and included in the Federal List of Extremist Materials.

11. Islamic State? Al-Qaeda? Two videos (Nokhchi Kmentishan, CHECHEN SONS and Oh my brother Mujahid, will the accusers' accusations affect you?) were found in

Kemerovo in 2013 and prohibited by the decision of Kemerovo's Lenininsky District Court on 14 August 2013.

12. National Socialist Society (international public association). Closed by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 1 February 2010). The screenshot of a graphic image saying National Socialism as a direction in life... Adolf Hitler, posted by A. Bedarev on his Vkontakte account (<https://vk.com/id262258>), was found in the town of Guryevsk in 2016 and blocked by the decision of Kemerovo Oblast's Guryevsk City Court on 19 September 2016) (35).

13. Dukhovno-Rodovaya Derzhava Rus (Spiritual and Patrimonial Russian Power, interregional public organization). Closed by the decision of the Moscow Regional Court on 5 April 2011 with the adjustment of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 12 July 2011). The following online materials were brought to court in 2014 and 2016: Blessing for the construction of the Cathedral of Free United Powers of the Spiritual and Patrimonial Russian Power (by the resolution of Kemerovo's Central District Court dated 24 November 2014); Marks Pelts's Vkontakte account (<http://vk.com/id252604712>), name the audio file entitled Koleso RODa, Antifa (by the decision of Kemerovo's Rudnichny District Court dated 17 February 2016) (35).

14. FORMAT-18 (interregional public association). Closed by the decision of the Moscow City Court on 20 December 2010. An audio file entitled The Moscow Mob, Format 18, posted by A. Bedarev on a Vkontakte account (<https://vk.com/id262258>), was found in the town of Guryevsk (by the decision of Kemerovo Oblast's Guryevsky Town Court dated 19 September 2016) (35).

15. Muvahhid Jamaat Group. Closed by the decision of the Leninsky District Court of the city of Astrakhan on 19 October 2007. A video entitled The Statement of the Muvahhidun Ar-Rusi Jamaat was found in Kemerovo in 2012 (by the decision of Kemerovo's Zavodsk District Court dated 21 November 2012).